I agree with the majority that neither the firearms nor the defendant's statement concerning the firearms were admissible at trial because both constituted evidence derived from the exploitation of an unlawful search warrant and, therefore, were tainted by that prior illegality. I write separately to emphasize my strong belief that, in light of the foregoing disposition, there is no reason to address the issue whether the defendant's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination was violated on the alternative ground that the police questioning of him exceeded the scope of his Miranda waiver. See separate opinion of Acoba, J.
It is well-settled that important questions regarding the interpretation
of constitutional provisions should ordinarily be decided only where such
decisions are necessary to the resolution of a case. See State
v. Bumanglag, 63 Haw. 596, 615, 634 P.2d 80, 93 (1981); Alfapada
v. Richardson, 58 Haw. 276, 278, 567 P.2d 1239, 1241 (1977); Smith
v. Smith, 56 Haw. 295, 305, 535 P.2d 1109, 1116 (1975); State
v. Marley, 54 Haw. 450, 457, 509 P.2d 1095, 1101 (1973). We should
be reluctant to address constitutional questions when it is not necessary
to so do. See Doe
v. Roe, 67 Haw. 63, 67, 677 P.2d 468, 471 (1984) ("Where cases can
be decided on grounds other than on a constitutional basis, this court
will find it unnecessary to confront a constitutional question."); State
v. Lo, 66 Haw. 653, 657, 675 P.2d 754, 757 (1983) ("[I]f a case
can be decided on either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional
question, the other a question of statutory construction or general law,
this court will decide only the latter.") (quoting Ashwander
v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936)) (Brandeis,
J., concurring) (internal quotation marks, ellipses points, and brackets
omitted); State v. Tin Yan,
44 Haw. 370, 383, 355 P.2d 25, 32 (1960) ("Courts generally will not pass
upon the constitutionality of a law unless necessary to the determination
upon the merits of the cause under consideration."); Territory
v. Gaudia, 41 Haw. 213, 214-15 (1955) ("[C]ourts will not pass upon
the validity of a statute in any case unless it is necessary to a decision
of the case so to do.") (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); cf. State
v. Aguinaldo, 71 Haw. 57, 61-62, 782 P.2d 1225, 1228 (1989) ("A
person to whom a statute may be constitutionally applied cannot challenge
the statute on the ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally
to others.") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The judicious
use of our authority and resources demands that we exercise prudence by
generally declining to issue opinions unnecessary to the resolution of
the case before us. Cf. In
re Mohr, 97 Hawai`i 1, 10, 32 P.3d 647, 656 (2001) ("the only check
upon the judicial branch's exercise of power is its own sense of self-restraint")
(internal brackets, quotation marks and citations omitted). Accordingly,
I would decline to address the Miranda
issue in this case.