Because she allegedly rammed a parking
lot gate with a vehicle, Defendant-Appellant Jo Anne Ann Walters
(Walters), was
arrested for and subsequently charged on April 16, 1999 by the police
with DUI and CPD. Despite the fact that the charges
arose from the same conduct in the same incident, See HRS §
701-109(2), the prosecution deferred consolidating the two
charges for trial. In deciding the prosecution had unjustifiably
delayed the trial in doing so, the district court made the
following relevant written findings:
5. On May 17, 1999, [Walters's
arraignment] on the DUI charge was continued to June 9, 1999. On May 20,1999, [Walters] was arraigned on
the CPD 4th charge; trial was set
for June 22, 1999. On June 9, 1999,[Walters] was arraigned on the DUI
charge; trial was set for August 17, 1999. At each
arraignment the State was aware that it was prosecuting [Walters] for
two offenses (CPD 4th and DUI) based on the same
conduct arising from the same episode. Yet, the State made no effort at
either arraignment to consolidate the charges for
trial;
6. . . . [Walters] and
her counsel arranged their respective work schedules around and
prepared for the two separate
trial dates;
7. On June
22, 1999[.] [Walters] appeared with counsel in court ready for trial on
the CPD 4th charge. The State moved for a continuance of the CPD
4th charge so that it
could later be consolidated with the DUI charge scheduled for trial on
August 17, 1999. The CPD 4th
charge was
continued, over [Walters's] objection, to August 17, 1999. The State was
aware of the DUI charge at the time of [Walters's]
arraignment on the CPD 4th charge on May 20, 1999; it knew that the
arraignment of the DUI charge had been continued to
June 9, 1999. At that arraignment, it made no effort to consolidate
the DUI charge with the CPD 4th charge. The State was
aware of the August 17, 1999, trial date for the DUI charge as of June
9, 1999, yet it made no effort to consolidate the
charges prior to the
June 22, 1999, CPD 4th trial date; nor did the State advise [Walters's]
counsel prior to [Walters's]
appearance in court on June
22, 1999, that it sought to continue the CPD 4th trial date;
8. On
August 17, 1999, [Walters] appeared with counsel ready for trial. The
case continued to September 7, 1999, due to court congestion. On
September 7, 1999, [Walters] again
appeared with counsel ready for trial. The parties agreed that
the case would be continued by stipulation because the court
calendar was long and it was
unlikely that the case would
proceed. On the next court date, October 27, 1999, [Walters]
appeared with counsel ready for trial. The State had not filed any
opposition to the three motions [Walters] had filed; . . .
The court continued the case to allow the State to file memos in
opposition to [Walters's] motions. The State chose to file
only one memorandum; it was in opposition to Defendant's Motion To
Dismiss Per HRS § 701-109; it was filed on
November 10, 1999[;]
9. On the
next court date, December 12, 1999, [Walters] appeared with counsel
ready for trial. The arresting officer and one other State witness was
absent. The court
continued the case. . . . On the next court date,February 9, 2000, [Walters]
appeared with counsel ready for trial. The court
continued the case over [Walters's]objection because it
believed that the matter should be heard by the judge who had set
the briefing schedule. Thecase was continued until March 22,
2000. [Walters] appeared with counsel ready for trial. The
State sought to arraign [Walters] on the new charge of CPD 4th and the
DUI charge and proceed to trial on both cases. . . .
(Emphasis added.)
In the light of these circumstances, I believe the district court's
determination that the "multiple continuances and delays"
prejudiced Defendant and "congested the court's calendar," was well
supported, thus warranting the exercise of the court's
discretion to dismiss the case based on its inherent power.
State v. Moriwake, 65 Haw.
47, 55, 647 P.2d 705, 711-12
(1982);
see also State v. Mageo 78 Hawai`i
33, 37, 889 P.2d 1092, 1096 (App. 1995). Accordingly, I would affirm
the
district court's May 18, 2000 order dismissing the charges with
prejudice.