I agree for the sake of the orderly administration and disposition of
cases that a collateral attack on a prior conviction should not be allowed
in the trial proceedings in which the prior conviction is an element to
be proven. But see, e.g.,People
v. Allen, 981 P.2d 525, 535-38 (1999) (holding that since the California
Supreme Court has required a colloquy as to a defendant's constitutional
rights, the "record [from the prior proceeding] should clearly demonstrate
the defendant was told of his rights and that he affirmatively waived them[,]"
and because of this ease of administration, "motions to strike prior felony
convictions" in a subsequent trial are permitted). I do not find the reasoning
in Custis v. United States,
511 U.S. 485 (1994), relied on by the majority, applicable because the
motivating factors there were based on federalism concerns of (1) "rummag[ing]
through frequently nonexistent or difficult to obtain state-court transcripts
or records that may date from another era, and may come from any one of
the 50 States[]" and (2) "'depriv[ing the state-court judgment] of [its]
normal force and effect in a proceeding that ha[s] an independent purpose
other than to overturn the prior judgment[s].'" Id.
at 497 (quoting Parke v.
Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 30 (1992) (brackets in original). As indicated
by the majority, the constitutional invalidity of a prior conviction, which
seems to have been conclusively established in this case, may still be
determined in subsequent collateral proceedings.