IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI`I
vs.
HARTFORD UNDERWRITERS INSURANCE COMPANY/PACIFIC INSURANCE
COMPANY, LTD., Defendant-Appellee
and
JOHN DOES, Defendants
APPEAL FROM THE FIRST CIRCUIT COURT
(CIV. NO. 93-1426)
ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL
(By: Moon, C.J., Levinson, Nakayama, and Acoba, JJ.,
and Intermediate Court of Appeals Judge Watanabe,
assigned by reason of vacancy)
Upon review of the record, it appears that the Honorable Richard W. Pollack's November 6, 2002 "Order Denying Motion for CAAP Arbitration" and December 24, 2002 order denying Plaintiff-Appellant James L. O'Connor's (Appellant O'Connor) motion for reconsideration are not appealable final orders under HRS § 641-1(a) (1993). Although the circuit court entered a May 12, 1995 judgment in favor of Defendant-Appellee Hartford Underwriters Insurance Company/Pacific Insurance Company, Ltd., two years later, on May 2, 1997, the intermediate court of appeals vacated the May 12, 1995 judgment in supreme court case number 19092, and remanded this case to the circuit court with two instructions: (1) enter an order staying this litigation pursuant to HRS § 658-5 (1993); and (2) appoint, on Appellant O'Connor's behalf, an arbitrator to a three-member arbitration panel, or appoint a single arbitrator in place of a three-member panel, if agreed to by the parties. "When a reviewing court remands a matter with specific instructions, the trial court is powerless to undertake any proceedings beyond those specified therein. . . . Further, remand for a specific act does not reopen the entire case; the lower tribunal only has the authority to carry out the appellate court's mandate." Standard Management, Inc. v. Kekona, 99 Hawai`i 125, 137, 53 P.3d 264, 276 (App. 2001) (citations, internal quotation marks, and brackets omitted). In binding arbitration pursuant to HRS Chapter 658, "[the] order confirming [the] arbitration award is [the] final judgment from which an appeal may be taken." Oppenheimer v. AIG Hawaii Insurance Co., 77 Hawai`i 88, 91, 881 P.2d 1234, 1237 (1994) (citation omitted). The circuit court has not entered an order confirming an arbitration award. Therefore, there is no appealable final judgment or order in this case, and Appellant O'Connor's appeal is premature.
Based on the collateral order doctrine, we have held that "an order denying an application made in accord with HRS § 658-5 for a stay of proceedings until arbitration has been had and one denying an application filed pursuant to HRS § 658-3 for an order directing that arbitration proceed in the manner provided in a written agreement are appealable orders within the contemplation of HRS § 641-1(a)." Association of Owners of Kukui Plaza v. Swinerton & Walburg Co., 68 Haw. 98, 107, 705 P.2d 28, 35 (1985). However, we have not applied the collateral order doctrine to an order denying a motion to compel arbitration in the Court Annexed Arbitration Program (CAAP) under HRS § 601-20 (1993). In order to fall within the narrow ambit of the collateral order doctrine, the order must, among other things, "be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment." Abrams v. Cades, Schutte, Fleming & Wright, 88 Hawai`i 319, 322, 966 P.2d 631, 634 (1998) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Although the November 6, 2002 order and December 24, 2002 order denied Appellant O'Connor's request for CAAP arbitration pursuant to HRS § 601-20 (1993), they did not deny Appellant O'Connor his right to arbitration pursuant to HRS § 658-5 (1993), and, thus, the November 6, 2002 order and December 24, 2002 order did not subject Appellant O'Connor to irreparable harm that was effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment. Therefore, the collateral order doctrine does not apply. Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this appeal is dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawai`i, June 9, 2003.