NOT FOR PUBLICATION
NO. 25189
IN
THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF HAWAI`I
AIG
HAWAII INSURANCE COMPANY, Respondent-Appellant-
Appellant, v. D. KEALA NALUAI, Claimant-Appellee-
Appellee, and J. P. SCHMIDT, (1)
INSURANCE COMMISSIONER,
STATE OF HAWAI`I, DEPARTMENT OF
COMMERCE AND CONSUMER
AFFAIRS, Appellee-Appellee
APPEAL
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT
(Civ. No. 01-1-3660)
SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER
(By: Watanabe, Acting C.J., Lim, and Foley, JJ.)
In this secondary appeal, Respondent-Appellant-Appellant AIG Hawaii Insurance Company (AIG) challenges the May 30, 2002 Judgment entered by the Circuit Court of the First Circuit (the circuit court), Judge Eden Elizabeth Hifo presiding.
AIG contends that the circuit court's Judgment should be reversed because the circuit court clearly erred in affirming the Commissioner's Final Order entered on December 4, 2001 by Appellee-Appellee Insurance Commissioner, Department of Commerce and Consumer Affairs, State of Hawai`i (the Commissioner), which, in turn, adopted a hearings officer's recommendation that AIG be required to pay three no-fault benefits claims made by Claimant-Appellee-Appellee D. Keala Naluai. We disagree.
The Hawai`i Supreme Court has stated that appellate review of an agency's decision "is qualified by the principle that the agency's decision carries a presumption of validity and appellant has the heavy burden of making a convincing showing that the decision is invalid because it is unjust and unreasonable in its consequences." In re Water Use Permit Applications, 94 Hawai`i 97, 118-19, 9 P.3d 409, 430-31 (2000) (ellipsis and block quote formatting omitted). According to the supreme court,
[Hawai`i Revised Statutes (HRS)] §
91-14(g) (1993) enumerates the standards of review applicable to an
agency appeal and provides: Upon review
of the record the court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand
the case with instructions for further proceedings; or it may reverse
or
modify the decision and order if the substantial rights of the
petitioners may have been prejudiced because the administrative
findings, conclusions,
decisions, or orders are:
(1) In violation of
constitutional or statutory provisions; or
(2) In excess of the
statutory authority or jurisdiction of the agency; or
(3) Made upon unlawful
procedure; or
(4) Affected by other error of law; or
(5) Clearly erroneous in
view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole
record; or
(6) Arbitrary, or
capricious, or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly
unwarranted exercise of discretion.
[Findings of Fact] are reviewable under the
clearly erroneous standard to determine if the agency decision was
clearly erroneous in view of reliable,
probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record. HRS
§ 91-14(g)(5).
[Conclusions of Law] are freely reviewable to
determine if the agency's decision was in violation of constitutional
or statutory provisions, in excess
of statutory authority or jurisdiction of agency, or affected by other
error of law. HRS §§ 91-14(g)(1), (2), and (4).
A [Conclusion of Law] that presents mixed
questions of fact and law is reviewed under the clearly erroneous
standard because the conclusion is
dependent upon the facts and circumstances of the particular case. When
mixed questions of law and fact are presented, an appellate court must
give deference to the agency's expertise and experience in the
particular field. The court should not substitute its own judgment for
that of the
agency.
[A Finding of Fact] or a mixed determination
of law and fact is clearly erroneous when (1) the record lacks
substantial evidence to support the
finding or determination, or (2) despite substantial evidence to
support the finding or determination, the appellate court is left with
the definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been made. We have defined
"substantial evidence" as credible evidence which is of sufficient
quality and
probative value to enable a person of reasonable caution to support a
conclusion.
Id. at 119, 9 P.3d at 431 (block quote formatting, citations, and internal brackets and some quotation marks omitted).
Applying the foregoing standards, we cannot conclude that the circuit court erred in affirming the Commissioner's Final Order. Accordingly, the circuit court's May 30, 2002 Judgment is affirmed.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawai`i, March 30, 2004.
On the briefs:
Katharine M. Nohr
(Miyagi,
Nohr & Myhre) for respondent-
appellant-appellant.
Deborah Day
Emerson and
David A. Webber, deputy
attorneys general, State of
Hawai`i, for appellee-appellee.
1. At the time this case arose, Wayne C. Metcalf, III was the Insurance Commissioner of the State of Hawai`i, Department of Commerce and Consumer Affairs, the Appellee-Appellee in this appeal. Pursuant to Hawai`i Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 43(c)(1) relating to substitution of parties, the current Insurance Commissioner, J. P. Schmidt, has been substituted as the named party to this case.