NOT FOR PUBLICATION
IN
THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF HAWAI`I
STATE
OF HAWAI`I, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
NELLENE K.S. MEYER, Defendant-Appellant,
and KRISTINE KWAI YING LAU, Defendant
APPEAL
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT
(CR. NO. 01-1-1646)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
(By: Burns, C.J., Lim and Foley, JJ.)
The October 7, 2002 "Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Finding Defendant Guilty as Charged in Counts I and II" state, in relevant part, as follows:
FINDINGS OF FACT
2. On January 15, 2001, at the Tommy [Hilfiger] store in Waikele, in the City and County of Honolulu, [Meyer] gave Jane Anacleto, store cashier, check No. 521 in the amount of $218.64 as payment for various items of clothing.
4. Jane Anacleto asked for and received from [Meyer] a photo identification. The photo on the identification matched [Meyer] and the name on the identification, Kristine Lau, matched the name on the check.
6. On February 16, 2001, approximately one
month later, Officer Jensen Okagawa asked Ms. Anacleto to view a
photographic lineup regarding the transaction of Kristine Lau from the
prior
day. Ms. Anacleto was shown a paper with photographs of six
unidentified females and picked out photograph number six as the person
who filled out and presented the check to her on
January 15, 2001. Photograph number six was a picture of [Meyer].
8. On October 2, 2001, . . . Kristine Lau entered a plea of no contest to each of the four charges against her.
10. Everything that was testified to occurred within the City and County of Honolulu, State of Hawaii.
1. A person commits the offense of Forgery in the Second Degree if, with intent to defraud, she falsely makes, completes, endorses or alters a written instrument, or utters a forged instrument, which is or purports to be, or which is calculated to become or to represent if completed, a commercial or other instrument which does or may evidence, create, transfer, terminate, or otherwise affect a legal right, interest, obligation, or status.
"Utter," in relation to a forged instrument, means to offer, whether accepted or not, a forged instrument with representation by acts or words, oral or in writing, that the instrument is genuine.
2. A person commits the offense of Theft in the Third Degree, if she obtains or exerts control over the property of another, with intent to deprive the other of the property, the value of which exceeds $100.00. . . .
. . . .
Jane Anacleto remembered [Meyer] because she hid behind the cash register before handling [sic] the check to Anacleto. Anacleto had the opportunity to view [Meyer] at the time of the offense as Anacleto was the cashier for the transaction, she paid attention to [Meyer] during the transaction because [Meyer] engaged in unusual behavior; the accuracy of the description of [Meyer] is high and the degree of certainty of Anacleto in her identification is also high. One month of time is a reasonably close proximity of time to make a reliable identification.
Meyer states her points of error as follows:
1. The trial court abused its discretion in finding [Meyer] guilty by narrowly and unfairly focussing on Jane Anacleto's identification testimony to the exclusion of equally relevant and exculpatory evidence. In its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order finding [Meyer] guilty as charged in Counts I & II, the trial court in findings of fact 1 through 10 narrowly focussed on Jane Anacleto's identification of [Meyer] to the exclusion of equally relevant and exculpatory evidence of the stipulated evidence of documents examiner Lloyd James Josey, Jr. [w]ho excluded [Meyer] from having authored the check in question and the impact of having previously accepted co-defendant [Kristine Lau's] no contest plea to the self same charges.
3. A corollary principal [sic] to the presumption of innocence is that where, -- in a jury waived trial, -- the same evidence can be viewed as being both inculpatory and exculpatory, the trial court must acquit the defendant and failure to do so constitutes an abuse of discretion.
More simply stated, Meyer contends that the record does not support her conviction because: (A) in his Crime Laboratory Report, Jim Josey, Senior Forensic Document Examiner, Honolulu Police Department, Crime Laboratory, opined that Meyer did not write the check; (B) Jane Anacleto testified that (1) only Meyer appeared at her cashier's station and (2) Meyer (a) wrote out and (b) uttered the check; (C) Kristine Lau previously pled no contest to, and was convicted of, the same charges; and (D) "where, -- in a jury waived trial, -- the same evidence can be viewed as being both inculpatory and exculpatory, the trial court must acquit the defendant and failure to do so constitutes an abuse of discretion." (Emphasis omitted.)Contention (D) is wrong. "Verdicts based on conflicting evidence will not be set aside where there is substantial evidence to support the trier of fact's findings." State v. Jenkins, 93 Hawai`i 87, 100-101, 997 P.2d 13, 26-27 (2000) (quoting Tsugawa v. Reinartz, 56 Haw. 67, 71, 527 P.2d 1278, 1282 (1974)) (brackets omitted). "It is well-settled that an appellate court will not pass upon issues dependent upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence; this is the province of the trier of fact." Id. at 101 (quoting State v. Buch, 83 Hawai`i 308, 321, 926 P.2d 599, 612 (1996)) (brackets omitted).
A trial court's findings of fact are reviewed under the "clearly erroneous" standard of review. Dan v. State, 76 Hawai`i 423, 428, 879 P.2d 528, 533 (1994). This is true of its implicit and explicit findings. (5) "A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when (1) the record lacks substantial evidence to support the finding, or (2) despite substantial evidence in support of the finding, the appellate court is nonetheless left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. State v. Okumura, 78 Hawai`i 383, 392, 894 P.2d 80, 89 (1995) (citation omitted).
The first half of the clearly erroneous test requires substantial evidence. On that issue, the Hawai`i Supreme Court has stated that:
We have long held that evidence adduced in the trial court must be considered in the strongest light for the prosecution when the appellate court passes on the legal sufficiency of such evidence to support a conviction; the same standard applies whether the case was before a judge or a jury. The test on appeal is not whether guilt is established beyond a reasonable doubt, but whether there was substantial evidence to support the conclusion of the trier of fact. Indeed, even if it could be said in a bench trial that the conviction is against the weight of the evidence, as long as there is substantial evidence to support the requisite findings for conviction, the trial court will be affirmed.
When applying the "clearly erroneous" test, it must be remembered that
State v. Eastman, 81 Hawai`i 131, 139, 913 P.2d 57, 65 (1996) (citations omitted).
According to the record, contentions (A), (B)(1), (B)(2)(b), and (C) are facts. However, as suggested by conclusion of law no. 6, the transcript shows that both the first sentence of finding of fact no. 3 and contention (B)(2)(a) are not supported by the evidence. Anacleto testified, in relevant part, as follows:
Q . . . .
A Yes.
Um, she was kind of hidden.
A But I could see her writing. That's all she had with her was the check.
A Yes.
Okay. Now the person who wrote the check is the same one who handed you the check; is that true?
. . . .
A It was hidden 'cause the register was blocking that portion.
A Correct.
Q So you're assuming it was a check, but
you're not positively sure; correct?
A Um, yes.
What Meyer fails to recognize is that even if the first sentence of finding of fact no. 3 and contention (B)(2)(a) are not facts, this combination does not provide her with a defense to the charges. This is so because the fact that Meyer wrote the check is not a material element of either charge. To convict Meyer of Forgery in the Second Degree under HRS § 708-852, the State was required to prove the elements stated in conclusion of law no. 3. To convict Meyer of Theft in the Third Degree under HRS § 708-832(1)(a), the State was required to prove the elements stated in conclusion of law no. 4.
Similarly, the fact that Kristine Lau pleaded no contest to the same charges does not prove that Meyer is innocent. "Guilty pleas of co-defendants are not relevant to or admissible as substantive evidence of a defendant's guilt or innocence." State v. Moore, 337 S.C. 104, 108-09, 522 S.E.2d 354, 357 (App. 1999); see also United State v. Halbert, 640 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. Solomon, 795 F.2d 747 (9th Cir. 1986). It is reasonably possible that (1) both Kristine Lau and Meyer are guilty of the same offense, and/or (2) Kristine Lau was merely trying to cover for Meyer by accepting sole blame.
Anacleto testified that when Meyer left the store, another girl walked out with her. That fact, considered together with the fact that Meyer may have only pretended to write out the check, and the facts of (A), (B)(1), (B)(2)(b), and (C), suggest that Kristine Lau participated with Meyer in the crimes. They do not prove that Kristine Lau committed the crimes and Meyer did not.
Accordingly, we vacate the following part of the October 7, 2002 "Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Finding Defendant Guilty as Charged in Counts I and II" that is printed in bold:
FINDINGS OF FACT
. . . .3. Jane Anacleto observed [Meyer] writing out the check on a small counter behind the cash register. She was able to observe [Meyer] as she was the cashier helping [Meyer].
We affirm the October 8, 2002 "Judgment Guilty Conviction and Probation Sentence."DATED: Honolulu, Hawai`i, August 10, 2004.
On the briefs:
Christopher R.
Evans
for Defendant-Appellant.
1.
The notice of appeal
was filed on October 29, 2002. The appeal was assigned to this court on
August 21, 2003.
2.
Unless otherwise stated, the Honorable Virginia Lea Crandall
presided.
3.
In pertinent part, Hawaii Revised Statutes
(HRS) § 708-852 (1) (Supp. 2003) states:
4. HRS § 708-832(1)(a) (1993) states:
5. Hawai`i Rules of Penal
Procedure Rule 23(c) provides:
(c) Trial without a jury. In a case
tried without a jury the court shall make a general finding and shall
in addition, on request made at the time of the general finding, find
such facts specially as
are requested by the parties. Such special findings may be orally in
open court or in writing at any time prior to sentence.