FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF HAWAI`I
---o0o---
DR.
GEORGE R. HARKER, Appellant-Appellant, v.
JUDITH SHAMOTO, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS;
PATRICIA HAMAMOTO,
SUPERINTENDENT OF EDUCATION, DEPARTMENT OF
EDUCATION and ROBYN HONDA, PERSONAL (1)
SPECIALIST FOR THE
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, Appellees-Appellees
NO. 25615
APPEAL
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT
(CIVIL NO. 02-1-0370(2))
MAY 14, 2004
BURNS, C.J., LIM and NAKAMURA, JJ.
OPINION OF THE COURT BY BURNS, C.J.
In this secondary appeal, Appellant George R. Harker (Harker) appeals from the Circuit Court of the Second Circuit's January 6, 2003 Final Judgment finalizing its January 6, 2003 Order Affirming Employment Security Appeals Office's Decision 0101433 Dated July 10, 2002 (January 6, 2003 Order). We affirm.Harker had been a substitute teacher with the Department of Education (DOE) beginning in 1998.
In the spring of 2001, Harker applied to renew his eligibility to be a substitute teacher for the 2001-02 school year. On April 2, 2001, Harker signed a DOE "Substitute Teacher General Request Form" that stated, in relevant part, as follows: "Upon issuance of the DOE employment document, Form SF 5A1, I will be eligible to . . . 2) Be called for assignments, as needed, for the school year, except for customary recesses, intersessions and vacations . . . ."
On May 25, 2001, the DOE sent Harker a Notification of Personnel Action, DOE Form SF 5A1, notifying him that he was "payroll certificated and eligible to be called for day-to-day, temporary duties as needed" effective July 1, 2001 to June 30, 2002, and that "SCHOOL START DATES VARY. THE LAST DAY FOR MOST SCHOOLS IS JUNE 7, 2002."
Harker applied for unemployment insurance benefits. In a June 19, 2001 Summary of Fact Finding Interview, Claims Examiner K. Aoki (Aoki) wrote that "Claimant does have a reasonable assurance of employment with the DOE after the summer break. Claimant is not entitled to benefit payments based on DOE wages beginning [Sunday] 6/10/01 to [Saturday] 7/28/01." Aoki also wrote, "([Claimant] substitute[s] for Lahaina Intermediate- Year Round Schedule. Returns from summer session 7/26/01)."
On September 18, 2001, Harker filed an appeal to the State of Hawai`i Department of Labor and Industrial Relations (DLIR). A hearing by Appeals Officer Judith Shamoto (Shamoto) was held on November 21, 2001. On July 10, 2002, Shamoto mailed her decision. It stated, in relevant part, as follows:
STATEMENT OF FACTS:
Employer's records showed that claimant was on the preferred list of three schools in his district. He accepted and worked 90 assignments at 8 different schools beginning on July 9, 2000. All schools ended on June 7, 2001. The records also showed that school terms for next payroll year beginning July 1, 2001, for year round, multi-track and traditional schools, began on July 25, 2001 and ended on June 7, 2002. Schools on traditional schedule began on August 21, 2001 and ended on June 7, 2002. (2)
Substitute teachers are casual employees who are hired with the understanding that they will work only as replacements for regular teachers who are absent or unable to teach their classes for other reasons. There are no guaranteed hours or benefits. The opportunity to work can fluctuate from 0 to 5 days per week. Claimant was aware of this policy when he applied for the job.
REASONS FOR DECISION: 383-29(b) (3)
Section 383-29(b) of the Hawaii Employment Security Law provides as follows:
(A) The existence of a job opening at the time of notification;
(B) The absence of any contingencies, such as:
(i) Future enrollment;
(ii) Availability of funding;
(iii) Vacancies due to absence of regular employees; or
(iv) Any other conditional factors;
. . . .
Claimant provided services in an instructional capacity for an institution of education during the academic school year ending June 7, 2001. He applied for and was given a contract for the next academic year for the same institution of education the earliest of which started on July 25, 2001. Although there were summer sessions at four of the schools at which he worked, the summer session periods for all four schools does not fall within the academic year. Employer continued to require the services of substitutes who are contacted on a rotation basis and by pre-arrangement as the work became available. Although the claimant contended that the employer's method of selection of teachers was a discriminatory process, there were only two methods by which teachers were offered work, by random selection or by pre-arrangement, both systems by which claimant obtained work. There was insufficient evidence to show that employer was engaged in any illegal practice as the courts have heard and upheld appeals from decisions rendered by the Department.
DECISION:
(Footnotes added.)
Harker appealed to the Circuit Court of the Second Circuit. Oral argument was held before Judge Shackley F. Raffeto on December 18, 2002. In its January 6, 2003 Order, the court stated, in relevant part, as follows:
In particular, the Court determines, using the clearly erroneous standard, that the appeals officer's findings of fact in her July 10, 2002 decision are not clearly erroneous and there is no basis to overturn or modify the findings or to remand the case for further findings.
With regard to mixed questions of fact and law, the Court determines pursuant to Camara v. Agsalud, 67 Haw. 212, 685 P.2d 794 (1984), giving due deference to the agency's expertise in the area, that there is no basis to overturn or modify the decision or to remand the case.
IT IS THEREFORE HEREBY ORDERED that the Employment Security Appeals Office Decision 0101433 dated July 10, 2002, is affirmed. There is insufficient reason to reverse or otherwise modify the decision, or to remand the case for further proceedings. There are no further issues or claims outstanding.
On January 31, 2003 Harker filed a notice of appeal from the January 6, 2003 Order. On August 6, 2003, his appeal was assigned to this court.STANDARDS OF REVIEW
An appellate court's review of a circuit court's review of an administrative agency's decision is a secondary appeal. Korean Buddhist Dae Won Sa Temple of Hawai`i v. Sullivan, 87 Hawai`i 217, 229, 953 P.2d 1315, 1327 (1998). In determining whether the circuit court's decision was right or wrong, the appellate court must apply the standards set forth in Hawai`i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 91-14(g) (1993) to the agency's decision. Id. HRS § 91-14(g) provides:
Upon review of the record the court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case with instructions for further proceedings; or it may reverse or modify the decision and order if the substantial rights of the petitioners may have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, conclusions, decisions, or orders are:
(2) In excess of the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the agency; or
(3) Made upon unlawful procedure; or
(4) Affected by other error of law; or
(5) Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record; or
(6) Arbitrary, or capricious, or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.
Pursuant to the above statutory provision, an agency's "conclusions of law are reviewable under subsections (1), (2), and (4); questions regarding procedural defects are reviewable under subsection (3); findings of fact are reviewable under subsection (5); and an agency's exercise of discretion is reviewable under subsection (6)." Korean Buddhist, 87 Hawai`i at 229, 953 P.2d at 1327 (quoting Bragg v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 81 Hawai`i 302, 304, 916 P.2d 1203, 1205 (1996)). Furthermore, an "agency's decision carries a presumption of validity, and appellant has the heavy burden of making a convincing showing that the decision is invalid because it is unjust and unreasonable in its consequences." Korean Buddhist, at 229, 953 P.2d at 1327.
State v. Kelekolio, 94 Hawai`i 354, 356, 14 P.3d 364, 366 (Haw. App. 2000) (citations omitted).
The Hawai#i Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that, when interpreting a statute, an appellate court's "foremost obligation is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature, which is to be obtained primarily from the language contained in the statute itself. And where the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, [a court's] only duty is to give effect to the [the statute's] plain and obvious meaning." State v. Wells, 78 Hawai`i 373, 376, 894 P.2d 70, 73 (1995) (internal quotation marks, citations, and brackets in original omitted). Accordingly,
we must read statutory language in the
context of the entire statute and construe it in a manner consistent
with its purpose.
When there is doubt, doubleness of meaning, or indistinctiveness or uncertainty of an expression used in a statute, an ambiguity exists.
. . . This court may also consider the reason and spirit of the law, and the cause which induced the legislature to enact it to discover its true meaning. Laws in pari materia, or upon the same subject matter, shall be construed with reference to each other. What is clear in one statute may be called upon in aid to explain what is doubtful in another.
State v. Rauch, 94 Hawai`i 315, 322, 13 P.3d 324, 331 (2000) (quoting State v. Kotis, 91 Hawai`i 319, 327, 984 P.2d 78, 86 (1999)) (internal quotation marks, citations, ellipses, and brackets and block quote format omitted).HARKER'S ARGUMENT
In his opening brief, Harker states, in relevant part, as follows:The issue is whether substitute teachers
should be able to collect unemployment benefits during the summer
months. After paying such benefits for
over twenty years the Department of Labor and Industrial Relations in
collaboration with the Department of Education initiated a policy to
deny
those benefits in or about 1997. The result was the evisceration and
emasculation of the safety net that made it possible to survive
economically as a
substitute teacher in Hawai`i.
. . . .
. . . [I]t would not be possible for the DOE
to make any statement regarding "reasonable assurance" with regard to
substitute teachers particularly as
it applies to the interim sessions at various schools during the months
of June and July.
. . . .
For over twenty years the DOE and the DLIR
paid substitute teachers for Christmas break, Spring break, summer
vacation period and all other
interim breaks. However in 1997 the DOE took the position that
substitute teachers should not be paid during the summer months since
there was
reasonable assurance that they would be employed the following fall. .
. .
. . . .
While years ago the usual academic year was from September and ending in June, however, today the trend is for year round schools with all sorts of interesting schedules. The academic year can not be generalized. . . .
For a teacher assigned to a particular school there is no ambiguity. The school is in session or it is out of session. If it is out of session the regular teacher is not eligible to collect unemployment insurance. The teacher is already being paid for this time though contractual relations with the DOE. The situation for the substitute teacher is quite different. Although a particular school may be on an interim break another school or schools will be in session. The substitute teacher goes where s/he is needed and works or not as needed.
Regardless of statements to the contrary by
the DOE, there is no reasonable assurance of work for a variety of
reasons.
1) the automated method of contacting
substitute teachers is totally unreliable and the results
unpredictable. The DOE notes that the system is
incompatible with cell phones, answering systems and just about every
other aspect of contemporary technology associated with the modern
phone. .
. .
If the substitute teacher is not sitting in
reasonable proximity to the phone and takes the call, the system will
hang up and call someone else. If the
substitute has a life, the likelihood of catching the phone is very
small. The professional educator and substitute teacher who wants to
have some
reasonable control over their teaching assignments cultivates
prospective jobs by establishing a network of teachers to establish
future work.
2. The facts show, at least in my own case, that being on the calling list doesn't necessarily mean one will work the first few weeks of school. . . .
It must be noted that under the current interpretation of things by the DOE and the DLIR substitute teachers are eligible to collect unemployment once school starts in the fall if they do not work a minimum of two days in each week. . . .
In his reply brief, Harker states, in relevant part, as follows:
The point is . . . there may be a summer break between two academic years when nothing is going on in the summer and the concept of not paying unemployment benefits under this interpretation of law might be valid. But there is another equally valid scenario where in fact there is a break between a term in one academic year and a summer term and then a break and then another term in a second academic year. This is the situation in the [DOE] operation. Many schools are shut down for the summer. However, a select few are not and offer a summer term. (4) During that summer term substitute teachers are employed.
.
. . The DOE is trying to suggest that during the summer substitute
teachers are on vacation just like regular teachers when in fact their
unemployment is because of reduced job opportunities and not any
contractual provision defining vacation time.
. . . .
For
twenty-six schools on Maui there is an open space between academic
years. For the four schools that are open in the summer there
is the
"term" conveniently overlooked by the DLIR in its
argument.
. . . .
.
. . The teachers have a contract that defines when they will work and
not work and more importantly when they are on paid vacation, i.e.
during the
summer term at all schools. If they choose to work during the summer it
is extra money. The substitutes do not have such a contract. They are
on
call and may be called or not as needed. . . .
. . . .
The
thing that must be kept in mind is that the substitute teacher does not
have a contract or any other sort of understanding as to when s/he is
on
vacation. A substitute teacher has not designated or defined vacation
and really has no assurance of work at any time for that matter.
. . . .
[Appellee-Appellee
Robyn] Honda acknowledges [in the answering brief at] page
12 that indeed summer school is in session and that teachers and
substitute teachers are being employed. Whether it is considered part
of the academic year is irrelevant and makes no difference what so
ever. The
fact is that school is in session and some teachers and substitutes are
being employed while other not. . . .
. . . .
Testimony shows that the DLIR and the DOE are purposely miss applying [sic] the notion that Hawai`i Statutes do not allow the payment of unemployment benefits or indeed that the unemployment program is suspended for substitute teachers during any period between two Academic years.
It is clear from the record that the DLIR and DOE have no intention of following the regulations promulgated by the State legislature in accord with Federal policy regarding unemployment compensation.
(Footnote added; emphasis in original; all sics omitted.)According to Harker, all school terms for the 2000-01 school year ended on Thursday, June 7, 2001. For the 2001-02 school year, the school terms for year-round schools began on Wednesday, July 25, 2001, and the school terms for schools on traditional schedule began on Tuesday, August 21, 2001. It appears that somewhere between June 7, 2001 and August 21, 2001, four of thirty schools on Maui had a summer school term. The precise question presented by this appeal is whether, for the summer break after June 7, 2001 and before July 25, 2001, Harker is entitled to benefit payments based on DOE wages. The answer is no.
DISCUSSION
As amended by Act 187 (1971), HRS § 383-29(b) stated, in relevant part, as follows:
Benefits based on service in an instructional . . . capacity in an institution of education shall not be paid to an individual for any week of unemployment which begins during the period between two successive academic years, or during a similar period between two regular terms, whether or not successive, . . . , if the individual has a contract or contracts to perform services in any such capacity for any institution or institutions of education for both such academic years or both such terms.
Relevant legislative history states that this "provision is intended to insulate the institutions against benefit claims during vacation, semester-break, or sabbatical leave periods when individuals are paid by but do not perform services for the institutions." Stand. Comm. Rpt. No. 429, Sen. J. at 978 (1971).
As amended by Act 148 (1977), HRS § 383-29(b)(1) (Supp. 2003) states, in relevant part, as follows:
Benefits based on service in an instructional . . . capacity in an institution of education shall not be paid to an individual for any week of unemployment which begins during the period between two successive academic years, or during a similar period between two regular terms, whether or not successive, . . . , if the individual performed such services in the first of such academic years or terms and if there is a contract or a reasonable assurance that such individual will perform services in any such capacity for any institution of education in the second of such academic years or terms.
Relevant legislative history states, in relevant part, as follows:(6) Denying benefits to certain professional school employees between terms of their school employment. This amendment specifies that benefits are to be denied to professional school employees between school terms if there is reasonable assurance of their reemployment.
1977 Stand. Comm. Rpt. No. 726, Haw. H.J. at 1623 (1977).
On December 24, 1986, the United States Department of Labor issued "Unemployment Insurance Program Letter No. 04-87" that states, in relevant part, as follows:
1. Purpose. To provide guidance
to State agencies on the interpretation of "reasonable assurance" as it
relates to application of the
denial
provisions of Section 3304(a)(6)(A), Federal Unemployment Tax Act
(FUTA).
"Reasonable assurance" is defined as a written, oral, or implied
agreement that the employee will perform services in the same or
similar capacity
during the ensuing academic year, term, or remainder of a term. . . .
. . . .
Harker contends that, as used in HRS § 383-29(b)(1), the phrase "academic years" refers to situations where there are no summer terms, whereas the phrase "regular terms" refers to situations where there are winter terms, spring terms, and summer terms. Although the record does not reveal when summer school began and ended in 2001, we will assume that it began after June 7, 2001 and before July 25, 2002. Harker further contends that substitute teachers have a reasonable assurance that they will not have an opportunity to perform services as substitute teachers during the summer terms. Thus, their work during the spring and their lack of work during the summer term exclude them from HRS § 383-29(b)'s ban on benefits "for any week of unemployment which begins . . . during a . . . period between two regular terms, whether or not successive, . . ., if the individual has a contract or contracts to perform services in any such capacity for any institution or institutions of education for both . . . such terms."
We disagree with Harker's conclusion that Hawaii Administrative Rule (HAR) 12-5-39(a)12 "provides that a 'term' can exist between academic years." Rule 12-5-39(a)12 speaks of "the ensuing academic year or term". The words "or term" were added as an alternative to "the ensuing academic year" to include those schools whose regular school academic term is not the typical regular school academic year.
In light of (1) the statement in Harker's April 2, 2001 "Substitute Teacher General Request Form" that "[u]pon issuance of the DOE employment document, Form SF 5A1, I will be eligible to . . . [b]e called for assignments, as needed, for the school year, except for customary recesses, intersessions and vacations . . . "; (2) the DOE's May 25, 2001 Notification of Personnel Action, DOE Form SF 5A1, notifying Harker that he was "payroll certificated and eligible to be called for day-to-day, temporary duties as needed" effective July 1, 2001 to June 30, 2002; (3) the use of the phrases "academic years" and "regular terms" in HRS § 383-29(b)(1); (4) the legislative history and purpose of HRS § 383-29(b)(1) (Supp. 2003); (5) HAR Rule 12-5-39; and (6) the December 24, 1986 "Unemployment Insurance Program Letter No. 04-87" issued by the United States Department of Labor, we conclude that HRS § 383-29(b)(1) was written so that when, based on DOE wages, a regular teacher or a substitute teacher applies for unemployment benefit payments for the period after the end of one school year and the beginning of the succeeding school year, the merits of the application will be decided without any consideration of the facts that (a) some schools have a summer school term, and (b) some regular teachers (and possibly some substitute teachers) are summer school teachers. The Hawaii Employment Security Law contemplates that a regular teacher who teaches during the regular school year or term will be on vacation during the summer break. The fact that some regular teachers are employed as teachers during the summer or that some regular teachers are involuntarily unemployed as teachers during the summer does not change that contemplation.
Thus, a regular teacher who teaches during the regular school academic year or term is not eligible for unemployment benefits during the summer break even when one or more summer school teaching positions was or were available and unsuccessfully sought. For purposes of the Hawaii Employment Security Law, summer school teaching positions are unrelated to, totally separate from, and unconnected with teaching positions during the regular school academic year or term.
The Hawaii
Employment Security Law does not apply a different rule in the case of
a substitute teacher. Thus, a substitute
teacher who teaches during the regular school year is not eligible for
unemployment benefits during the summer break even
when one or more summer school substitute teaching positions was or
were available and unsuccessfully sought. For
purposes of the Hawaii Employment Security Law, summer school
substitute teaching positions are unrelated to, totally
separate from, and unconnected with substitute teaching positions
during the regular school academic year or term.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court's decision denying Harker unemployment benefits during the period from June 10, 2001 through July 28, 2001.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawai`i, May 14, 2004.
On the briefs:
Frances E.H. Lum
and
Robyn M. Kuwabe,
Deputy Attorneys General
for Appellee
Director of Labor and
Industrial
Relations
1. The word "Personal", as used in the caption of this case, should be "Personnel".
2. The record does not clearly explain the difference between "year round, multi-track and traditional schools" and "[s]chools on traditional schedule".
3. Hawai`i Revised Statutes § 383-29(b) (2003).
4. The dates of the 2001 "summer term" were not
stated.