FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
---o0o---
STATE OF HAWAI`I, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
TIMOTHY C. REES, Defendant-Appellant
NO. 26470
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT
NORTH & SOUTH HILO DIVISION
(CITATION NO. 1803070MH)
MAY 27, 2005
BURNS, C.J., WATANABE AND LIM, JJ.
OPINION OF THE COURT BY BURNS, C.J.
Defendant-Appellant Timothy C. Rees (Rees) appeals from the district court's March 23, 2004 Judgment finding him "guilty" of the offense of "Expired Safety Sticker[,]" Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 286-25 (1993), and ordering him to pay a $40 fine and a $15 administrative fee. We conclude that, because the offense of "Expired Safety Sticker" is a civil traffic infraction and not a criminal offense, the district court improperly found Rees "guilty[.]" Therefore, we vacate the March 23, 2004 Judgment and remand for entry of a replacement judgment in compliance with the applicable statutes.BACKGROUND
A. The Relevant Statutes
The statutes governing safety stickers are included in HRS Chapter 286 (1993 and Supp. 2004) and state, in relevant part, as follows:
DIVISION 1. GOVERNMENT
TITLE 17. MOTOR AND OTHER VEHICLES
CHAPTER 286. HIGHWAY SAFETY
PART II. INSPECTION OF VEHICLES
§ 286-21 Vehicles without required equipment or in unsafe condition. No person shall drive or cause to move on any highway any motor vehicle, trailer, semitrailer, or pole trailer, or any combination thereof, unless the equipment thereon is in good working order and adjustment as required in this part so as not to endanger the driver or other occupant or any person upon the highway.
(b) If the vehicle is found to be in an unsafe condition or if any required part or equipment is not present or if any required part or equipment is present but not in proper repair, the officer shall issue a citation to the owner or driver stating the reasons that the vehicle is deemed unsafe and shall require that a new certificate of inspection as provided in section 286-26 be obtained within five days or that the defect be cured.
(d) Any person aggrieved by this section shall have the right to a hearing before a district judge of the circuit in which the person is cited within five days. The judge shall determine whether the chief of police or any police officer reasonably performed the chief of police's or police officer's duties hereunder and shall make any appropriate order.
§ 286-23 Responsibility for compliance. (a) Every owner or driver, upon receiving a citation as provided in section 286-22(b), shall comply therewith and shall within five days secure an official certificate of inspection or make the necessary corrections or repairs, or the driver may request a hearing as provided in section 286-22(d).
§ 286-24 Registered owner's responsibility; registration plates as prima facie evidence as to the fault of the registered owner. In any proceeding for violation of this part, the registered owner of a vehicle shall be deemed responsible for the unsafe condition of the vehicle.
§ 286-25 Operation of a vehicle without a certificate of inspection. Whoever operates, permits the operation of, causes to be operated, or parks any vehicle on a public highway without a current official certificate of inspection, issued under section 286-26, shall be fined not more than $100.
§ 286-26 Certificates of inspection. (a) The following vehicles shall be certified as provided in subsection (e) once every year:
(2) Buses;
(3) Rental or U-drive motor vehicles two years of age or older; and
(4) Taxicabs.
(b) All other vehicles, including motorcycles, trailers, semitrailers, and pole trailers having a gross vehicle weight rating of 10,000 pounds or less, and antique motor vehicles as defined in section 249-1, except those in subsections (c) and (d), shall be certified as provided in subsection (e) every twelve months; provided that any vehicle to which this subsection applies shall not require inspection within two years of the date on which the vehicle was first sold.
(1)
It is determined by a police officer or an insurer
that the vehicle's equipment has been damaged so as to render the
vehicle
unsafe; or
(2) It is rebuilt or restored.
(e) Upon application for a certificate of inspection to be issued for a vehicle, an inspection as prescribed by the director under subsection (g) shall be conducted on the vehicle, and if the vehicle is found to be in a safe operating condition, a certificate of inspection shall be issued upon payment of a fee to be determined by the director. The certificate shall state the effective date, the termination date, the name of the issuing insurance carrier, and the policy number of the motor vehicle insurance identification card for the inspected motor vehicle as specified by section 431:10C-107 or state the information contained in the proof of insurance card as specified by section 431:10G-106. A sticker, authorized by the director, shall be affixed to the vehicle at the time a certificate of inspection is issued. An inspection sticker which has been lost, stolen, or destroyed shall be replaced without reinspection by the inspection station that issued the original inspection sticker upon presentation of the vehicle's current certificate of inspection; provided that the current certificate of inspection and inspection sticker shall not have expired at the time the replacement is requested. The director shall adopt rules to determine the fee for replacement of lost, stolen, or destroyed inspection stickers.
(g) The director of transportation shall adopt necessary rules for the administration of inspections and the issuance of certificates of inspection.
(1)
Any motor vehicle which is covered by part XI,
governing safety of motor carrier vehicle operation and equipment;
provided that the rules
adopted pursuant to part IA impose standards of inspection at least as strict as those imposed
under subsection (g) and that certification is required
at least as often as provided in subsections (a), (b), (c), and (d); and
(2)
Aircraft servicing vehicles that are being used
exclusively on lands set aside to the department of transportation for
airport
purposes.
HRS Chapter 291D (1993 & Supp. 2004), which sets forth the procedures applicable to traffic infractions, states, in relevant part, as follows:
DIVISION 1. GOVERNMENT
TITLE 17. MOTOR AND OTHER VEHICLES
[CHAPTER 291D.] ADJUDICATION OF TRAFFIC INFRACTIONS
[§ 291D-1] Purpose. Act 222, Session Laws of Hawaii 1978, began the process of decriminalizing certain traffic offenses, not of a serious nature, to the status of violations. In response to a request by the legislature, the judiciary prepared a report in 1987 that recommended, among other things, further decriminalization of traffic offenses, elimination of most traffic arraignments, disposition of uncontested violations by mail, and informal hearings where the violation or the proposed penalty is questioned. The legislature finds that further decriminalization of certain traffic offenses and streamlining of the handling of those traffic cases will achieve a more expeditious system for the judicial processing of traffic infractions. . . .
"Hearing" means a proceeding conducted by the district court pursuant to section 291D-8 at which a driver either contests the notice of traffic infraction or admits to the traffic infraction but offers an explanation to mitigate the monetary assessment imposed.
"Trial" means a trial conducted by the district court pursuant to the Hawaii Rules of Penal Procedure and rules of the district court.
§ 291D-3 Applicability. (a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, all traffic infractions shall be adjudicated pursuant to this chapter, except as provided in subsection (b). This chapter shall be applied uniformly throughout the State and in all counties. Penal sanctions except fines shall not apply to a violation of a county ordinance that would constitute a traffic infraction under this chapter. Traffic infractions shall not be classified as criminal offenses.
(c) If the defendant fails to appear for a traffic infraction which is committed in the same course of conduct as a criminal offense for which the offender is arrested or charged, the court shall enter a judgment by default in favor of the State for the traffic infraction unless the court determines that good cause or excusable neglect exists for the defendant's failure to appear. The court shall enter a disposition pursuant to the Hawaii rules of penal procedure for the criminal offense.
§ 291D-5 Notice of traffic infraction; form; determination final unless contested. (a) The notice of traffic infraction shall include the complaint and summons for the purposes of this chapter. Whenever a notice of traffic infraction is issued to the driver of a motor vehicle, the driver's signature, driver's license number, and current address shall be affixed to the notice. If the driver refuses to sign the notice, the officer shall record this refusal on the notice and issue the notice to the driver. Individuals to whom a notice of traffic infraction is issued under this chapter need not be arraigned before the court, unless required by rule of the supreme court.
(1) A statement of the specific traffic infraction, including a brief statement of facts, for which the notice was issued;
(2)
A statement of the monetary assessment, established
for the particular traffic infraction pursuant to section 291D-9, to be
paid by the driver
which shall be uniform throughout the State;
(3)
A statement of the options provided in section
291D-6(b) for answering the notice and the procedures necessary to
exercise
the options;
(4)
A statement that the person to whom the notice is
issued must answer, choosing one of the options specified in section
291D-6(b), within fifteen
days;
(5)
A statement that failure to answer the notice of
traffic infraction within fifteen days shall result in the entry of
judgment by
default for the State
and a late penalty assessed and, if the driver fails to pay the monetary assessment within an additional
thirty days or otherwise take action to set
aside the default, notice to the director of finance of the appropriate county that
the person to whom the notice was issued shall not be permitted to
renew or obtain a driver's license or, where the notice
was issued to a motor
vehicle, the registered owner will not be permitted to register, renew
the
registration of, or transfer
title to the motor vehicle until the traffic infraction is finally disposed of pursuant to this chapter;
(6)
A statement that, at a hearing to contest the notice
of traffic infraction conducted pursuant to section 291D-8 or in
consideration of a written
statement contesting the notice of traffic infraction, no officer will be present unless the driver
timely requests the court to have the officer present.
The standard of proof to be applied by the court is whether a
preponderance of the evidence proves that the specified traffic infraction was
committed;
(7)
A statement that, at a hearing requested for the
purpose of explaining mitigating circumstances surrounding the
commission
of the infraction or
in consideration of a written request for mitigation, the person will be considered to have committed the
traffic infraction;
(8) A space in which the driver's signature, current address, and driver's license number may be affixed; and
(9) The date, time, and place at which the driver must appear in court if the driver chooses to go to hearing.
§ 291D-6 Answer required. (a) [Subsection effective until June 30, 2004. For subsection effective July 1, 2004, see below.] A person who receives a notice of traffic infraction shall answer the notice within fifteen days of the date of the notice. There shall be included with the notice of traffic infraction a preaddressed, postage paid envelope directed to the traffic violations bureau of the applicable district court.
(b) In an answer to a notice of traffic infraction, a person shall either:
(l)
Admit the commission of the infraction by completing
the appropriate portion of the notice of traffic infraction and
submitting it, either by mail
or in person, to the authority specified on the notice together with payment, except as provided
in section 291D-9(d), in the amount of the monetary
assessment stated on the notice of traffic infraction. Payment by mail
shall be in the form of a check, money order, or by approved credit card.
Payment in person shall be in the form of United
States currency, check, money order, or by approved credit card;
(2)
Deny the commission of the infraction by completing
the appropriate portion of the notice of traffic infraction and
submitting it, either by mail or
in person, to the authority specified on the notice. In lieu of a hearing, the person may submit
a written statement of grounds on which the person
contests the notice of traffic infraction, which shall be considered by
the court as a statement given in court pursuant to section 291D-8(a); or
(3)
Admit the commission of the infraction and request a
hearing to explain circumstances mitigating the infraction by
completing the appropriate
portion of the notice of traffic infraction and submitting it, either by mail or in person, to the
authority specified on the notice. In lieu of a hearing,
the person may submit a written explanation of the mitigating
circumstances, which shall be considered by the court as a statement given in court
pursuant to section 291D-8(b).
§ 291D-7 Court action after answer or failure to answer. (a) When an admitting answer is received, the court shall review the driver's abstract. The court shall enter judgment in favor of the State in the amount of the monetary assessment specified in the notice of traffic infraction. If the monetary assessment is not submitted with the answer, the court shall take action as provided in section 291D-10.
(1) In the case of a traffic infraction that does not involve parking, the court shall proceed as provided in section 291D-8(a).
(2)
In the case of a traffic infraction that involves
parking, the court shall notify the person or registered owner or
owners in
writing of the date, time,
and place of hearing to contest the notice of traffic infraction. The notice of hearing shall be sent
within thirty days from the postmarked date of the
answer to the address stated in the denying answer or, if none is given,
to the address at
which the vehicle is registered. The notification also shall
advise the person that, if the person fails to
appear at the
hearing, the court shall enter judgment by default in favor of the
State, as of the date of the
scheduled hearing,
that the monetary
assessment must be paid within thirty days from notice of default, and,
if it is not paid, that the court will
take
action as provided in section 291D-10.
(3)
When a denying answer is accompanied by a written
statement of the grounds on which the person contests the notice of
the traffic infraction,
the court shall proceed as provided in section 291D-8(a) and shall notify the person of its decision,
including the amount of the monetary assessment
by mailing it within thirty days of the postmarked date of the answer to
the address provided by the person in the answer, or if none is given to the
address given when the notice of traffic
infraction was issued
or, in the case of parking violations, to the address stated in the
denying answer or, if
none is given,
to the address at
which the vehicle is registered. The decision also shall advise the
person, if it is determined that the
infraction was
committed, that the person has the right, within thirty days, to request a trial and shall specify the procedures
for doing so. The notice of decision
shall also notify the person, if a monetary assessment is assessed by the court, that if
the person does not request a trial, the assessment shall be paid
within thirty days. The notice shall warn the person that if
the assessment is not paid within thirty days, the court shall take action as provided in
section 291D-10.
(1) In the case of a traffic infraction which does not involve parking, the court shall proceed as provided in section 291D-8(b).
(2)
In case of a traffic infraction which involves
parking, the court shall notify the person in writing of the date,
time, and place
of the hearing. The
notice shall be sent, within thirty days from the postmarked date of the answer, to the address at which
the vehicle is registered. The notice of
hearing on mitigating circumstances shall advise the person that the court will enter
judgment for the State and the hearing will be limited to an
explanation of the mitigating circumstances. The notice of hearing
also shall state that if the person fails to appear at the hearing, the monetary
assessment must be paid within thirty days of
the scheduled hearing. The
notice of hearing shall warn the person that if the monetary assessment
is
not paid within thirty
days, the court shall take action as provided in section 291D-10.
(3)
If a written explanation is included with an answer
admitting commission of the infraction, the court shall enter judgment
for
the State and, after
reviewing the explanation, determine the amount of the monetary assessment to be assessed, if any. The
court shall then notify the person of the
monetary assessment to be paid for the infraction, if any. There shall be no appeal
from the order. If the court assesses a monetary assessment, the
court shall also notify the person that the assessment shall
be paid within thirty
days of the postmarked date of the decision. The notice shall also
warn the person that if the monetary
assessment is not paid within thirty days, the court shall take action as provided in section 291D-10.
(e) Whenever judgment by default in favor of the State is entered, the court shall mail a notice of entry of judgment of default to the address provided by the person when the notice of traffic infraction was issued or, in the case of parking violations, to the address stated in the answer, if any, or the address at which the vehicle is registered. The notice shall advise the person that the monetary assessment shall be paid within thirty days and shall explain the procedure for setting aside a default judgment. The notice shall also warn the person that if the monetary assessment is not paid within thirty days, the court shall take action as provided in section 291D-10. Judgment by default for the State entered pursuant to this chapter may be set aside pending final disposition of the traffic infraction upon written application of the person and posting of an appearance bond equal to the amount of the monetary assessment and any other assessment imposed pursuant to section 291D-9. The application shall show good cause or excusable neglect for the person's failure to take action necessary to prevent entry of judgment by default. Upon receipt of the application, the court shall take action to remove the restriction placed on the person's driver's license or the motor vehicle's registration and title imposed pursuant to section 291D-10. Thereafter, the court shall determine whether good cause or excusable neglect exists for the person's failure to take action necessary to prevent entry of judgment by default. If so, the notice of traffic infraction shall be disposed of pursuant to this chapter. If not, the appearance bond shall be forfeited and the notice of traffic infraction shall be finally disposed. In either case, the court shall, within thirty days, determine the existence of good cause or excusable neglect and notify the person of its decision in writing.
(1)
In lieu of the personal appearance by the officer
who issued the notice of traffic infraction, the court shall consider
the notice of traffic infraction
and any other written report made by the officer together with any oral or written
statement by the driver, or in the case of traffic infractions
involving parking, the operator or registered owner of the
motor vehicle;
(2)
The court may compel by subpoena the attendance of
the officer who issued the notice and other witnesses from
whom it may wish to hear;
(3)
The standard of proof to be applied by the court
shall be whether a preponderance of the evidence proves that the
traffic infraction was
committed; and
(4)
After due consideration of the evidence and
arguments, if any, the court shall determine whether commission of the
traffic infraction has been
established. Where the commission of the traffic infraction has not been established, an
order dismissing the notice of traffic infraction with
prejudice shall be entered in the records. Where it has been
established that the
traffic infraction was committed, the court shall enter judgment for
the State and may assess a
monetary assessment
pursuant to section 291D-9. The court also shall inform the person of
the right to request,
within
thirty days, a trial pursuant to section 291D-13. If the person requests a trial at the hearing, the court shall
provide the person
with the trial date forthwith. If trial is elected, arraignment and
plea shall be held at the time of
trial.
(1)
The procedure shall be informal and shall be limited
to the issue of mitigating circumstances. A person who requests
to explain the
circumstances shall not be permitted to contest the issuance of the notice of traffic infraction; and
(2)
After the court has received the explanation, the
court shall enter judgment for the State and may assess a monetary
assessment, pursuant to
section 291D-9; and
(3)
The court after receiving the explanation may vacate
the admission and dismiss the notice of traffic infraction with
prejudice where the
explanation establishes that the infraction was not committed; and
(4) There shall be no appeal from the order.
[§ 291D-9] Monetary assessments. (a) A person found to have committed a traffic infraction shall be assessed a monetary assessment not to exceed the maximum fine specified in the statute defining the traffic infraction.
(c) In addition to any monetary assessment imposed for a traffic infraction, the court may impose additional assessments for:
(2) The cost of service of a penal summons issued pursuant to this chapter.
[§ 291D-10] Restriction on driver's license and motor vehicle registration. (a) When the person issued a notice of traffic infraction not involving parking fails to pay a monetary assessment that has been ordered, the court shall cause an entry to be made in the driver's license record so as to prevent the person whose assessment is outstanding from acquiring or renewing the person's driver's license until the outstanding assessment is paid or the notice of traffic infraction is otherwise disposed of pursuant to this chapter.
. . . .
§ 291D-13 Trial. (a) If, after proceedings to contest the notice of traffic infraction, a determination is made that a person committed the traffic infraction, the person may request, within thirty days of the determination, a trial pursuant to the rules of penal procedure and rules of the district court, provided that arraignment and plea for such trial shall be held at the time of trial. If the person requests a trial at the conclusion of the proceedings to contest the notice of traffic infraction, the court shall provide the person with the trial date forthwith. A notice of traffic infraction shall not be adjudicated pursuant to this section until proceedings pursuant to section 291D-8 have been completed.
[§ 291D-14] Rules. (a) The supreme court may adopt rules of procedure for the conduct of all proceedings pursuant to this chapter.
(c) Notwithstanding section 604-17, while the court is sitting in any matter pursuant to this chapter, the court shall not preserve the testimony or proceedings, except proceedings conducted pursuant to section 291D-13.
(e) Chapter 91 shall not apply in proceedings before the court.
B. The Relevant Facts
The relevant facts are undisputed. On November 14, 2003, a police officer cited Rees for violating HRS § 286-25 (1993) (operation of a vehicle without a current certificate of inspection) while driving a 1988 Toyota. At a December 15, 2003 HRS § 291D-2 court "hearing" in which Judge Matthew S. K. Pyun presided, the following, in relevant part, was stated:
THE COURT: You received a citation for a delinquent safety check on November 14th. Are you contesting that matter?
. . . .
THE COURT: Yes, it is.
Thereafter, immediately prior to the HRS §§ 291D-2 and -13 court "trial" held on February 26, 2004, with Judge John Moran presiding, the following, in relevant part, was stated:
THE COURT: Right.
THE COURT: Sixty seconds or less tell me why.
. . . .
During the February 26, 2004 trial, Rees stated, in relevant part, as follows:
[REES]: That statute 286-25 is merely the penalty phase of a body of law that was supposed to work together to insure that the police and the courts were doing everything within their power to create safer vehicles on the highway. Or to maintain safety on the highways. To regulate traffic. To regulate condition of vehicles. This is merely the penal phase of it which was meant to be implemented after 286-22 gave proper notice to the person that they were in violation of any safety provision or that they were lacking any required part or equipment. The safety sticker is a required part or equipment.
The March 23, 2004 Judgment is signed by the "Clerk of Court" and states as follows:JUDGMENT
Fine $40.00; Administrative Fee $15.00
Rees filed his notice of appeal on March 24, 2004. On March 30, 2004, by letter, Rees asked the district court to enter relevant findings of fact and conclusions of law. The district court did not respond to his request. On December 8, 2004, this appeal was assigned to this court.DISCUSSION
A.
This appeal by Rees is based on his view of the legislature's intended application of HRS § 286-25. In his opening brief, Rees states his view, in relevant part, as follows:
When I asked "What's wrong, officer?" I was greeted with "Can I see your License, Registration, and Insurance card? . . . Then he came back over and told me he was citing me for "expired safety sticker". The citation was already written and he explained the options for disposition of it, and I signed it. He was professional and courteous and though I was mad at myself for somehow missing the expiration, I conducted myself civilly and bore no animosity towards him or his partner. However, I did then state, "Now I'd like to say something to you, - this really should be a warning or a fix-it ticket. You guys have to know that no one's aware that their sticker has expired when they get this ticket. Who is telling you to go "zero tolerance" on this? . . . You know that when a driver of a safe, legal vehicle gets notice, the first thing they'll do is renew it. So why penalize them? What are your bosses thinking?"
In his reply brief, Rees states, in relevant part, as follows:I went to the Mayor's office and the Police station, told them I was scheduled for a hearing in the Third District. And that I would be challenging the Police Policy of citing under [HRS §] 286-25, and not utilizing [HRS §] 286-22. I asked and practically begged them to appear at the proceeding to present their side. . . .
. . .
It is not fair to punish people engaging in the very conduct these
Statutes were created to insure and promote. The Police and the Courts
have
acted to impose Court made law with a corresponding cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of many U.S. Constitutional immunities. The
State
has been allowed and encouraged to prosecute innocent civilians upon
the mere inference of some kind of negligence but never stating any
harm,
threat to public safety, or damage to property. They have never
sufficiently alleged any offense. If my sticker was expired then I
acted in
accordance with Statute 286-25, not in violation. It is merely a
statement of fact not a violation or described as a penalty.
The facts in this case are that a police officer observed that the safety sticker affixed to the vehicle Rees was operating had expired. That observation authorized the police officer to make a traffic stop. Upon investigation, the police officer determined that the vehicle Rees was operating did not have a current official certificate of inspection. Based on the fact that Rees had operated his automobile "on a public highway without a current official certificate of inspection, issued under section 286-26[,]" HRS § 286-25 commands that Rees "shall be fined not more than $100."
The imposition of the penalty specified in HRS § 286-25 upon a person who operates an automobile "on a public highway without a current official certificate of inspection, issued under section 286-26[,]" motivates owners of motor vehicles operated on public highways to comply with laws requiring those motor vehicles to be (1) periodically inspected for safety, and (2) insured for liability. We conclude that it is within the power of the legislature to motivate compliance with those safety inspection and liability insurance laws by imposing the penalty specified in HRS § 286-25. This case does not present the Judiciary with any valid basis for questioning the enforceability of HRS § 286-25.
B.
The expired safety sticker offense that Rees was found to have committed is punishable by a fine of not more than $100. HRS § 286-25. Pursuant to HRS §§ 291D-2 and 291D-3(a), therefore, the offense is considered a civil traffic infraction and "shall not be classified as [a] criminal offense[ ]."
In this case, Rees denied committing the offense for which he was cited. As noted above, HRS § 291D-7(b) provides in part that in the case of a non-parking traffic infraction where a denying answer is received, "the court shall proceed as provided in section 291D-8(a)."
As noted above, HRS § 291D-8(a)(3) and (4) (Supp. 2004) state as follows:
§ 291D-8 Hearings. (a) In proceedings to contest the issuance of a notice of traffic infractions:
(3)
The standard of proof to be applied by the court
shall be whether a preponderance of the evidence proves that the
traffic infraction
was
committed; and
(4)
After due consideration of the evidence and
arguments, if any, the court shall determine whether commission of the
traffic
infraction has been
established. Where the commission of the traffic infraction has not been established, an order dismissing the
notice of traffic infraction with
prejudice shall be entered in the records. Where it has been established that the traffic infraction was
committed, the court shall enter judgment for
the State and may assess a monetary assessment pursuant to section 291D-9. The
court also shall inform the person of the right to request, within
thirty days, a trial pursuant to section 291D-13. If the person
requests a trial at
the hearing, the court shall provide the person with the trial date
forthwith. If trial is elected, arraignment and plea
shall be held at the time of trial.
Although the legislative history indicates that the Hawaii Rules of Penal Procedure process and the criminal standard of proof apply to a contested trial held pursuant to HRS § 291D-13, nothing in the legislative history indicates or suggests that, when a defendant exercises his or her statutory option to go to trial to contest an alleged infraction, the infraction thereupon becomes a criminal offense.
Accordingly, we vacate the district court's March 23, 2004 Judgment and remand for entry of a judgment for the State as follows:
JUDGMENT
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 26th day of February, 2004 , in the above entitled cause, the District Judge of the above entitled court entered judgment for the State and assessed the following monetary assessments pursuant to Hawaii Revised Statutes § 291D-9 (1993):
On the briefs:
Glenn H. Shiigi,
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney,
County of Hawai`i,
for Plaintiff-Appellee.