FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE
INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE
STATE OF HAWAI‘I
---o0o---
NO. 26452
JANUARY
12, 2006
BURNS,
C.J., WATANABE AND FOLEY, JJ.
Per Curiam. Defendant-Appellant Wailani Luella Camp (Wailani or Defendant) appeals from the February 24, 2004 Divorce Decree entered in the Family Court of the First Circuit. (1)
We conclude that: (1) the February 24, 2004 Divorce Decree did not take effect prior to February 24, 2004; (2) Plaintiff-Appellee Gary Edward Camp (Gary or Plaintiff) died on October 17, 2003, prior to the February 24, 2004 Divorce Decree; (3) Gary's death on October 17, 2003, extinguished (2) the divorce case and the family court's jurisdiction to enter any subsequent orders/decrees/judgments, including the February 24, 2004 Divorce Decree. We remand with instructions.
BACKGROUND
Gary was born on October 6, 1935. Wailani was born in January 1942.
In July 1976, Wailani purchased 1312 Mokapu Boulevard, Kailua, Hawai‘i, 96734 (Mokapu property) as a leasehold estate. Gary and Wailani were married on May 22, 1981. When they married, Gary owned a residence in California. In 1986, (1) Gary (a) sold his California residence, netting $112,211.24 and (b) retired as an International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers electrician with 25.85 years of service; and (2) Wailani added Gary to her Mokapu title as a tenant in common, not by the entirety.
In 1994, Gary and Wailani purchased the fee of the Mokapu property.
On November 2, 2001, Gary filed a complaint for divorce. On May 29, 2002, Judge Bode A. Uale entered an order stating, in relevant part,
without prejudice to final accounting and allocation at time of trial[,] Plaintiff agrees (1) to pay Defendant $300 per month commencing June 1, 2002 as and for temporary alimony . . .; (2) to pay monthly mortgage payments . . .; and (3) to permit Defendant to continue to apply for reimbursement of her medical expenses from Plaintiff's medical insurance policy[.]
On October 25, 2002, Wailani filed a motion to set the case for a contested bench trial.Plaintiff's Position Statement filed on January 6, 2003, states, in relevant part:
Plaintiff is seven years older than Defendant, and his health is very poor. He has had heart valve replacement in 1993 and therefore, he cannot perform strenuous work. He has hearing impairment from his service in the Korean War, and he is classified as disabled as a result. He was diagnosed with cancer in 1994 and completed treatment in 1995. Plaintiff recently had a biopsy and awaits those result [sic]. Plaintiff also has diabetes, which was diagnosed in 1997.
In Plaintiff's Amended Position Statement filed on March 25, 2003, Gary contended that he should be awarded all of the Mokapu property subject to its mortgage. He alleged that he was not aware until these divorce proceedings that Wailani was the owner of one-half of the property at 835 Mokulua Drive, Lanikai, Hawai‘i (Lanikai property). He further alleged, in relevant part:
j) In 1994, in the course of the
parties' refinancing of the Mokapu mortgage, in part to purchase the
fee to that property, a multitude of documents were executed by the
parties, for that
transaction. Among those papers was a letter, purportedly executed by
Plaintiff, under notary seal, (hereafter referred to as "marital
agreement"), that stated that he renounced any claim he may
have to the Lanikai property. The Lanikai property was put up as
partial collateral for the Mokapu loan, with Agnes Wright signing onto
the parties' second mortgage for Mokapu as a security
collateral for their loan. . . . That marital agreement was procured by
fraud, . . . .
k) Despite the dismissal of the divorce, in late 1992, the parties continued to have marital problems, and they continued to express their intention to divorce. In 2001, Plaintiff re-filed for the divorce. In the course of discovery, Plaintiff learned that Defendant had sold her interest in the Lanikai property to her children and daughter-in-law, for $225,000.00.
The divorce trial occurred on April 1, 2003, August 4, 2003, and August 5, 2003.On April 24, 2003, Gary executed his Last Will (i) giving "all of my estate to the trustee under that Trust Agreement in which I am both the current trustee and trustor, which Trust is dated April 24, 2003"; and (ii) appointing his adult daughter from a prior marriage, namely Jean Ann Camp, as the personal representative of his estate.
On April 24, 2003, Gary executed a Deed conveying his interest in the Mokapu property to "GARY E. CAMP, TRUSTEE OF THE GARY E. CAMP REVOCABLE LIVING TRUST DATED April 24, 2003[.]" (3)
At the conclusion of the trial on August 5, 2003, the court ordered the parties to file closing briefs by August 26, 2003, and to file responsive briefs by September 3, 2003, and stated that the court would render a written decision by September 16, 2003. In its written Decision and Order entered on October 10, 2003 (October 10, 2003 Decision and Order), the court decided, in relevant part:
II. Relevant Facts and Reasonable Inferences Therefrom.
The October 10, 2003 Decision and Order also decided that, when Wailani and Gary were married, the Lanikai property was owned one-half by Wailani and one-half by her mother Agnes Wright (Agnes). Agnes lived there with her disabled brother Bernard Hauanio. In 1998, Wailani gifted her interest in the Lanikai property one-half to her son William Broad (William) and one-half to her daughter Laura Turner. In 1998, by an agreement of sale, Agnes sold her one-half interest in the Lanikai property to William and his wife "Tiare-Cowan-Broad". The October 10, 2003 Decision and Order decided that "Lanikai's present title shall remain undisturbed, status quo, with the exception that separate life estates in Lanikai are hereby created, ordered and decreed in favor of Bernard Hauanio, Agnes Wright and Defendant." (4)
On October 17, 2003, Gary died. On October 20, 2003, apparently unaware of Gary's death, Wailani filed a motion for reconsideration requesting that the family court (5)
reconsider in part its award or credit to Plaintiff of (1) the $112,211.24 proceeds from the [Plaintiff's California residence] sale on the grounds that appreciation of [Plaintiff's California residence] during the marriage is marital partnership property; (2) the $56,105.62 for renovations to the Mokapu Boulevard property on the grounds that the funds expended were marital partnership property or, in the alternative, Plaintiff would receive a double recovery of this amount; and (3) the $34,776.00 for 60 months of mortgage payments on the Mokapu Boulevard mortgage on the grounds that Plaintiff's income as an electrician used for payment of the mortgage was marital partnership property.
On October 30, 2003, Wailani notified the court of Gary's death and moved to dismiss the divorce case, asserting that the court lacked jurisdiction. (6) On November 6, 2003, Jean Ann Camp, as personal representative of Gary's estate (JeanPR), filed her opposition to Wailani's motion for reconsideration. On November 12, 2003, Wailani filed her reply in support of her motion for reconsideration. On November 17, 2003, the court entered its order stating, in relevant part:Defendant is correct that the court erred and the Mokapu renovations credit to the Plaintiff consists of a double recovery to Plaintiff. Accordingly, the $56,105.62 cost of the Mokapu renovations shall be a credit to the Defendant and Plaintiff's payment to Defendant for his sole title to the Mokapu property should be increased accordingly.
On December 22, 2003, JeanPR filed two motions: (1) to be substituted as a party in place of Gary, and (2) for entry of a divorce decree nunc pro tunc to October 10, 2003. In an affidavit accompanying the first motion, Jean stated, in relevant part: "My father began this divorce with the defendant approximately two years ago. The last two years of my father's life were consumed by a variety of legal events including a criminal prosecution of the defendant for assault against my father that resulted in a conviction."On January 16, 2004, after a hearing on January 15, 2004, the court entered an order substituting JeanPR as a party in place of Gary.
On January 21, 2004, after a hearing on January 15, 2004, the court entered a "Decision and Order Re (1) Defendant Wailani Camp's Motion to Dismiss Filed on October 30, 2003 & (2) Motion for Entry of Decree of Absolute Divorce Nunc Pro Tunc Filed on December 22, 2003" (January 21, 2004 Decision and Order) which stated, in relevant part:
On October 10, 2003, this court issued and filed a detailed trial Decision And Order containing the rationale for court's conclusions and instructing Gary to prepare and submit for signing and filing a Decree of Absolute Decree [sic] consistent with the trial Decision And Order's provisions as decreed.
IT IS HEREBY ADJUDGED, ORDERED, AND DECREED as follows:
On July 16, 2004, the court entered an "Order Granting Ex Parte Motion to Order the Department of Health, State of Hawaii, to Prepare an Amended Certificate of Death for Gary Edward Camp, Plaintiff Now Deceased, to Reflect That Defendant, Wailani Luelle Camp and Plaintiff Were Divorced as of the Date of Death, By Order of the Family Court".
On July 27, 2004, the "State of Hawaii, Department of Health's Motion for Clarification of Discrepancy in Court Orders" was filed.
On August 9, 2004, Wailani filed "Defendant Wailani Luella Camp's Motion to Amend Divorce Decree to Render It an Appealable Decree". On September 14, 2004, the Hawai‘i Supreme Court entered an order (1) noting that "the family court considered the motion and indicated its inclination to grant the requested relief and approve a stipulation agreed to by the parties[,]" and (2) remanding the case to the family court to grant the requested relief. On September 20, 2004, pursuant to the stipulation of the parties, the family court entered an order replacing paragraph D of the Divorce Decree with the following:
D. Personal Property. The court hereby orders the division and distribution of [the] parties' personal property as stated in Defendant's Exhibit BB . . . . Any property not listed in this exhibit is hereby awarded to the party in possession of that property at the time of this decree.
At that point, the Divorce Decree became final for purposes of appeal.3. Full force and effect shall, therefore, be given to the following orders:
RELEVANT STATUTES, COURT RULES AND PRECEDENTS
Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 580-41(1) (1993) provides: "The family court shall decree a divorce from the bond of matrimony upon the application of either party when the court finds: (1) The marriage is irretrievably broken[.]"
HRS § 580-45 (1993) states as follows:
(Emphasis added.)
HRS § 580-46 (1993) provides:
Final judgment; nunc pro tunc entry; validation of certain marriages. Whenever either party to a divorce action is entitled to a final decree dissolving the bonds of matrimony, but by mistake, negligence, or inadvertence the final decree has not been entered, the court on motion of either party or upon its own motion may cause a final decree to be entered granting the divorce as of the date when the decree could have been entered. Upon the entry of the final decree, the parties to the divorce action shall be deemed to have been restored to the status of single persons as of the date set forth in the final decree, and any marriage of either party after such date shall not be subject to attack on the grounds that the marriage was contracted at a time when the party was undivorced in the divorce action. The court may cause a final decree to be entered nunc pro tunc as provided in this section even though another final decree may have been entered previously but by mistake, negligence, or inadvertence was not entered as soon as a final decree could have been entered.
HRS § 580-56 (1993) provides, in relevant part:
Rule 54. Judgment; costs.
The Hawai‘i Rules of Appellate Procedure (2005) provides, in relevant part:
Rule 4. Appeals - When taken.
Hawaii divorce cases involve a maximum of four discrete parts: (1) dissolution of the marriage; (2) child custody, visitation, and support; (3) spousal support; and (4) division and distribution of property and debts. Black v. Black, 6 Haw.App. 493, 728 P.2d 1303 (1986). In Cleveland v. Cleveland, 57 Haw. 519, 559 P.2d 744 (1977), the Hawaii Supreme Court held that an order which finally decides parts (1) and (4) is final and appealable even if part (2) remains undecided. Although we recommend that, except in exceptionally compelling circumstances, all parts be decided simultaneously and that part (1) not be finally decided prior to a decision on all the other parts, we conclude that an order which finally decides part (1) is final and appealable when decided even if parts (2), (3), and (4) remain undecided; that parts (2), (3), and (4) are each separately final and appealable as and when they are decided, but only if part (1) has previously or simultaneously been decided; and that if parts (2), (3), and/or (4) have been decided before part (1) has been finally decided, they become final and appealable when part (1) is finally decided.
ARGUMENT
Wailani's opening brief cites to HRS §§ 580-45 and -46 and sundry non-Hawai‘i precedents and authorities in support of the common law rule that the family court was not authorized to enter a divorce decree after Gary's death. For example, her opening brief notes that
an action for divorce is a purely personal action which abates upon the death of either party." Turner, B. R., Equitable Distribution of Property, Section 3.01 at 51 (2d ed. 1994), citing Parkhurst v. Parkhurst, 799 S.W.2d 159, 161 (Mo.Ct.App. 1990 ("Husband's death prior to the entry of a decree by the trial court caused the immediate abatement and final termination of the dissolution proceeding.")
The facts of this case do not satisfy the requirements of HRS § 580-46, and JeanPR does not argue to the contrary.JeanPR's answering brief cites sundry non-Hawai‘i precedents and authorities in support of JeanPR's contention that the "Ministerial Act Exception" applies. This exception is described as follows: "If the divorce decree has not yet been entered at the time of death, but the court has made all of the necessary substantive decisions, and the only tasks remaining before entry of the decree are purely ministerial, the majority rule is that the divorce case does not abate." Turner, B. R., Equitable Distribution of Property, (2d ed. 1994), 2004 Supplement at 32.
JeanPR's answering brief cites Vessels v. Vessels, 530 S.W.2d 71 (Tenn. 1975), for the following rule:
Rule 58.02 of the Tennessee
Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "[t]he filing with the clerk of
a judgment, signed by the judge, constitutes the entry of said
judgment, and, unless the court
otherwise directs, no judgment shall be effective for any
purpose until the entry of same. . ." (emphasis supplied) It is noted
in the comments of the advisory committee that Rule 58.02 is
designed to make uniform across the state the procedure for entry of
judgment and to make certain the effective date of a judgment.
In the case sub judice there is no
order specifically stating the decree of divorce is to be effective at
a date other than the date the decree was filed with the clerk after
being signed by the trial
judge. However, there is an order in the record clearly indicating the
trial judge intended the divorce decree to be effective as of the date
it was pronounced and that he believed he had done
everything necessary to make the decree effective as of that date in
entering "a notation on the file of the case that the divorce was
granted and the property was awarded on the 21st day of
June, 1974." Cf. Rush v. Rush, 97 Tenn.
279, 37 S.W. 13 (1896); McCown v. Quillin, 48
Tenn.App. 162, 344 S.W.2d 576 (1960). This expressed intent, though
bottomed on the wrong
premise, in our opinion was a direction by the trial court that the
decree of divorce be effective as of June 21, 1974. Accordingly, we
affirm the trial judge's action in overruling the motion to
set aside the decree of divorce.
Wailani's reply brief also notes that certain parts of the Divorce Decree are substantially different from the Decision and Order because changes were made in the personal property provisions to achieve finality after this appeal was filed. It argues that "[e]ven if the 'ministerial act exception' applied, the family court did not make 'all the necessary substantive decisions' before Gary died."
DISCUSSION
As noted above, in the situation where "the court has made all of the necessary substantive decisions, and the only tasks remaining before entry of the decree are purely ministerial[,]" the Ministerial Act Exception permits the appellate court to conclude that the judgment subsequently entered is entered as of the date the court has made all of the necessary substantive decisions notwithstanding the fact that the judgment subsequently entered does not state that it is effective prior to its entry. Thus, in Vessels v. Vessels, the Tennessee case cited above, the fact that the trial judge entered "a notation on the file of the case that the divorce was granted and the property was awarded on the 21st day of June, 1974" permitted the appellate court to conclude that the divorce occurred on June 21, 1974, notwithstanding the fact that the decree subsequently entered did not indicate that it was "effective at a date other than the date the decree was filed with the clerk after being signed by the trial judge."
As noted above, the family court's January 21, 2004 Decision and Order states, in relevant part:
Here, the trial court's intention is very much detailed in its trial Decision And Order filed October 17 [sic], 2003.
Conclusion "(1)" is wrong because the October 10, 2003 Decision and Order states that "a divorce, from the bonds of matrimony on the grounds that the marriage is irretrievably broken, shall be granted to Plaintiff effective upon the signing and filing of a Divorce Decree to be prepared by the Plaintiff." (Emphasis added.)
The validity of conclusion "(2)" requires an examination of the February 24, 2004 Divorce Decree in the light of the applicable statutes, rules and precedent. Did HRS § 580-45 permit the court to have "otherwise ordered" the February 24, 2004 Divorce Decree to "take effect" prior to October 17, 2003? In light of the relevant legislative history, we conclude that the answer is no.
HRS § 580-45 was enacted in 1870. Since that time, it has been amended fourteen times. (7) After comparing the various amendments to the statute since 1870, it appears the relevant parts of HRS § 580-45 are similar to parts enacted in 1911. Prior to 1911, the statute read, "If after a full hearing, the judge shall be of opinion that a divorce ought to be granted, either from the bonds of matrimony or from bed and board, an absolute decree shall be entered." Revised Laws of the Territory of Hawaii (RLH) § 2235 (1905). In 1911, the statute was amended by H.B. 158, signed into law as Act 136, to read as follows:
[RLH] Section 2235. Decree. If, after a full hearing, the court or judge shall be of opinion that a divorce ought to be granted, either from the bonds of matrimony or from bed and board, a decree shall be signed, filed and entered, which shall take effect from and after such time as may be fixed by the court or judge in such decree, but in case of a decree dissolving the bonds of matrimony, such time so fixed shall not be more than one month from and after the date of said decree.
1911 Laws of the Territory of Hawaii Act 136, § 1 at 198 (quotation marks omitted). While the statute has been subject to numerous amendments since 1911, the language at issue has remained in substantially similar form. To aid in the interpretation of the ambiguous phrase "from and after such time" (8) in the current version of HRS § 580-45, it is therefore necessary to examine the legislative history of the 1911 amendments.The Sixth Territorial Legislature evinced a policy disfavoring "hasty" divorces. See Hse. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 249, in 1911 House Journal, at 548. House Bill No. 158, which was enacted as 1911 Haw. Sess. L. Act 136, § 1 at 198, and codified as what is now HRS § 580-45, was intended to discourage divorces by requiring a certain period of time to elapse after the entry of the divorce decree and prior to the effective date of the divorce. The House Judiciary Committee stated:
The purpose of this Act is to prevent hasty divorces. The provision that in case of a decree dissolving the bonds of matrimony a certain amount of time shall elapse before the decree becomes final, has worked very successfully in other parts of the United States, and is in line with modern legislation.
Id. The Senate Judiciary Committee added:This bill seeks to add to the provisions of our present statute a clause giving the court or judge granting a divorce the power to fix the time when the decree shall take effect, limiting his discretion in this regard so far as divorce from the bonds of matrimony are concerned to not more than one month from and after the date of the decree.
Sen. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 297, in 1911 Senate Journal, at 948-49. These reports indicate that the legislature wished to (1) discourage "hasty" divorces by permitting courts to enter decrees that would take effect at a later date and (2) limit the discretion of the courts in this regard to a one month period "from and after" the date of the entry of the decree.When the relevant terms of HRS § 580-45 are construed in light of its legislative history, they indicate that courts have discretion in fixing the effective date of the divorce decree but that this discretion is limited to a one month period commencing the date of the entry of the decree. Consequently, it does not authorize courts to order the divorce decree to be effective prior to the date of its entry.
In the instant case, did the court order the divorce decree to be effective prior to its entry? The answer is no.
In construing the terms of a divorce decree, the determinative factor is the intent of the court as gathered from the decree and other evidence. Bowman v. Bennett, 250 N.W.2d 47, 50 (Iowa 1977); Hill v. Hill, 3 Wash.App. 783, 477 P.2d 931 (1970). A judgment or decree like any other written instrument is to be construed reasonably and as a whole, Smith v. Smith, 56 Haw. 295, 301, 535 P.2d 1109, 1114 (1975), and effect must be given not only to that which is expressed, but also to that which is unavoidably and necessarily implied in the judgment or decree. Pope v. Pope, 7 Ill.App.3d 935, 289 N.E.2d 9 (1972).
Anderson v. Anderson, 59 Haw. 575, 584-85, 585 P.2d 938, 944, reh'g denied, 59 Haw. 667 (1978).The February 24, 2004 Divorce Decree states, in relevant part:
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, we remand for an order (1) dismissing this divorce case effective October 17, 2003, (2) vacating all orders and decrees entered thereafter, and (3) granting such other relief as may be necessary to effectuate the consequences of this opinion.
1. The Honorable Gregg Young presided.
2. We use the word "extinguished" rather than the word "abated" because "extinguished" is the word used in Hawai‘i Family Court Rules Rule 25 (2005) which pertains to the subject of the "substitution of parties".
3. It appears that, when the court entered the October 10, 2003 Decision and Order, it was unaware that, on April 24, 2003, Gary had conveyed his interest in the Mokapu property to "GARY E. CAMP, TRUSTEE OF THE GARY E. CAMP REVOCABLE LIVING TRUST DATED April 24, 2003[.]"
4. Assuming Wailani gifted her interest in the net market value of the Lanikai property one-half to her son William Broad (William) and one-half to her daughter Laura Turner and, by an agreement of sale, Agnes sold her one-half to William and his wife "Tiare-Cowan-Broad", we question the family court's jurisdiction in this divorce case to enter any orders affecting the rights of the non-party owners of the Lanikai property.
5. It appears that, in dividing and distributing the assets and debts of the parties, the family court did not apply the Partnership Model Division method explained and applied in Jackson v. Jackson, 84 Hawai‘i 319, 933 P.2d 1353 (App. 1997), and cases cited therein.
6. Hawai‘i Family Court Rules Rule 25 (2005) provides, in relevant part: