NO. 28377
IN
THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
OF
THE STATE OF HAWAI‘I
IN THE MATTER OF
THE APPLICATION OF ROBERT BLAINE BOETTNER
and DONALD GENE BRANSFORD, Applicants-Appellants/
Appellees/Cross-Appellees, and EDWARD R. KENNEDY, JAMES
WHITCOMB, JAMES
GILMUR, DUKE McELROY, DAWN ROBERTS, FENN
SHRADER, and the MAUI MEADOWS HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION,
Intervenors-Appellees/Appellants/Cross-Appellees, LAWRENCE
CHRISTOPHER, Intervenor-Appellee/Appellee/Cross-Appellee,
BOARD OF VARIANCES AND
APPEALS, COUNTY OF MAUI, Agency-
Appellee/Appellee/ Cross-Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT
(Civ. No. 05-1-0095(3))
ORDER
(By: Recktenwald, C.J., Watanabe and Foley, JJ.)
Applicants-Appellants/Appellees Robert Blaine Boettner and Donald Gene
Bransford (Appellees) move to dismiss for mootness the appeal of
Agency-Appellee/Appellant, Board of Variance and Appeal, County of
Maui (Board) and the appeal of Intervenors-Appellees/Appellants Edward
R. Kennedy, James Whitcomb, Lawrence Christopher, James Gilmur, Duke
McElroy, Dawn Roberts, Fenn Shrader, and the Maui Meadows Homeowners
Association (Intervenors). Appellees also move the court to find,
pursuant to
Rule 38 of the Hawai‘i Rules of Appellate Procedure (HRAP), that the
Board and Intervenors filed frivolous appeals. For the reasons that
follow, we grant the
motion to dismiss the appeal for mootness and deny the motion to find
the appeals frivolous.
I.
On June 5, 2003, Appellees submitted to the Board an application for
height variances from the Maui County Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance
(CZO) and the Maui County Housing Code (Housing Code) for a
building being constructed in the Maui Meadows subdivision. On July 25,
2003, the Maui County Planning Director (Planning Director) notified
Appellees
that their application was complete and that a public hearing on the
application would be held by the Board on September 11, 2003.
Thereafter, the Board
commenced proceedings to consider the application and allowed
Intervenors to intervene. On April 20, 2004, Appellees filed a motion
for a determination that
the application for variances be deemed approved for the reason that
the Board did not issue a written final decision on the application
within 120 days from the
date the application was deemed complete by the Planning Director. On
January 13, 2005, the Board entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law and
Decision and order denying Appellees' motion (Board's decision).
Appellees filed an appeal to the Circuit Court of the Second Circuit
from the Board's
decision. On December 1, 2005, the circuit court issued an order that
reversed the Board's decision and specifically determined that
Appellees' application for
height variances was deemed approved as a matter of law. Judgment was
entered by the circuit court on July 28, 2006. This appeal and
cross-appeal followed.
II.
A.
Appellees contend
that this appeal and cross-appeal are moot because: (a) On May 8, 2007,
Planning Director issued a letter concluding that the height
restrictions for structures constructed in the Maui Meadows subdivision
are determined by the Housing Code and not the CZO; (b) on June 6,
2007, the Maui
Meadows subdivision and the Maui Corporation Counsel issued an opinion
letter concurring with Planning Director's decision; and (c) at a
September 11, 2004
hearing before the Board, Appellees withdrew their request for height
variances from the Housing Code since the County of Maui had testified
that Appellees'
home and cottage complied with the Housing Code.
The Board
maintains that its appeal does not address the merits of the
application for variances, but rather, whether the circuit court erred
when it deemed
Appellees' application for variances approved as a matter of law.
Intervenors argue against dismissal on the grounds that the parties did
not litigate the
mootness issue before the circuit court and briefing is complete. The
supreme court explained in Lathrop
v. Sakatani, 111 Hawai‘i 307, 141 P.3d 480 (2006)
that
the duty of this court, as of every other
judicial tribunal, is to decide actual controversies by a judgment
which can be carried into effect, and not to give opinions upon moot
questions or
abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which
cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before it.
Courts
will not consume time deciding abstract propositions of law or moot
cases, and have no jurisdiction to do so.
Id. at 312, 141 P.3d at 485
(brackets deleted, quoting Wong
v. Bd. of Regents, Univ. Of Hawaii, 62 Haw. 391, 394-95, 616
P.2d 201, 204 (1980)). The
supreme court also stated:
It is well-established that:
The mootness doctrine is said to encompass
the circumstances that destroy the justiciability of a suit previously
suitable for determination. Put another way, the suit must remain alive
throughout the course of litigation to the moment of final appellate
disposition. Its chief purpose is to assure that the adversary system,
once set in operation, remains properly fueled. The
doctrine seems appropriate where events subsequent to the judgment of
the trial court have so affected the relations between the parties that
the two conditions for justiciability relevant on
appeal--adverse interest and effective remedy--have been compromised.
Id.
at 394, 616 P.2d 201, 203-04 (1980); see also Okada Trucking Co. V. Bd.
Of Water Supply, 99 Hawai‘i 191, 195-96, 53 P.3d 799, 803-04 (2002);
Kona Old Hawaiian Trails Group v.
Lyman, 69 Haw. 81-87,734 P.2d 161, 165 (1987).
Lethrop v. Sakatani,
111 Hawai‘i at 312-13, 141 P.3d at 485-86.
Dismissal of an appeal is the appropriate remedy where the case is
moot, unless the case "involve[s] questions that affect the public
interest and are capable of repetition, yet evading review." Id. at 314, 141 P.3d at
487 (internal quotation marks omitted).
In this case, as a
result of the decision of Maui County officials that a height variance
from the CZO was not needed for construction on property located within
the Maui Meadows subdivision where Appellees intend to build and the
withdrawal by Appellees of their application for a height variance from
the Housing
Code, this appeal no longer presents a live controversy which would
allow us to issue a decision that can be carried into effect. For even
if we were to rule in
favor of Appellants and determine that the circuit court erred in
deeming Appellees' application approved, the case would have to be
remanded to the Board for
further proceedings; and since Appellees withdrew their application for
a height variance from the Housing Code and are not required to obtain
a height
variance from the CZO, there is no longer any need for the Board to act
on Appellees' application.
We also conclude
that no exception to the mootness doctrine applies to this case.
Applications for height variances from the CZO and Housing Code are
based
on the unique circumstance of an individual applicant. The Board claims
that this appeal should not be dismissed as moot because the main issue
involves the
applicability of the automatic approval sanctions imposed by Hawai‘i
Revised Statutes (HRS) §91-13.5 (Suppl. 2004)
(1) for untimely decisions by the Board, an
issue capable of repetition yet evading review. We note however, that
in 2006, HRS §91-13.5 was amended to allow county agencies to be
exempted from its
requirements. HRS §91-13.5(f) (Supp. 2006), Act 280, 2006 Haw.
Sess. Law 1155. Therefore, no exception to the mootness doctrine is
applicable.
B.
Appellees further
move for a ruling that the Board and Intervenors filed frivolous
notices of appeal. For an appeal to be frivolous, it must be "so
manifestly and
palpably without merit as to indicate bad faith on the pleader's part
such that argument to the court was not required." Child Support Enforcement Agency
v.
Doe, 109 Hawai‘i 240, 253, 123 P.3d 461, 474 (2005) (quoting Rhoads v. Okumura, 98
Hawai‘i 407, 413, 49 P.3d 373, 379 (2002)). We cannot conclude that
the appeals in this case were manifestly and palpably without merit.
Consequently, the notices of appeal were not frivolous.
III.
For the foregoing
reasons,
IT IS HEREBY
ORDERED that the motion to dismiss the appeal for mootness is granted,
and this appeal is dismissed.
IT IS FURTHER
ORDERED that the motion to find the Board and MMHA filed frivolous
notices of appeal is denied.
DATED: Honolulu,
Hawai‘i, December 11, 2007.
1.
At the time Appellees' application for height variances was
filed with Agency-Appellee/Appellant, Board of Variance and Appeal,
County of Maui (Board), HRS §91-13.5 (Supp. 2004)
stated:
Maximum time period for business or development-related
permits, licenses, or approvals; automatic approval; extensions.
(a) Unless otherwise provided by law, an agency shall adopt rules that
specify a maximum time period to grant or deny a business or
development-related permit, license, or approval; provided that
the application is not subject to state administered permit programs
delegated, authorized, or approved under federal law.
(b) All such issuing agencies shall clearly articulate informational
requirements for applications and review applications for completeness
in a timely manner.
(c) All such issuing agencies shall take action to grant or deny
any application for a business or development-related permit, license
or approval within the established maximum period of
time, or the application shall be deemed approved.
(d) The maximum period of time established pursuant to this section
shall be extended in the event of a national disaster, state emergency,
or union strike, which would prevent the
applicant, the agency, or the department from fulfilling application or
review requirements.
(e) For purposes of this section, "application for a business or development-related
permit, license, or approval" means any state or county application,
petition, permit, license,
certificate, or any other form of a request for approval required by
law to be obtained prior to the formation, operation, or
expansion of a commercial or industrial enterprise, or for any permit,
license, certificate, or any form of approval required
under sections 46-4, 46-4.2, 46-4.5, 46-5, and chapters 183C, 205,
205A, 340A, 340B, 340E, 340F, 342B, 342C, 342D, 342E, 342F,
342G, 342H, 3421, 342J, 342L, and 342P.