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NO. 28836
JUNE 29, 2009
WATANABE, ACTING C.J., NAKAMURA AND FUJISE, JJ.
OPINION OF THE COURT BY FUJISE, J.
Defendant-Appellant Blake Yasuo Nakamura (Nakamura) appeals from the October 5, 2007 Amended Judgment and Sentence entered by the District Court of the First Circuit, Honolulu Division (district court), (1) convicting him of the offense of Excessive Speeding in violation of Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 291C-105 (2007). As his sole issue on appeal, Nakamura challenges the imposition of a six-month driver's license suspension as a term of his sentence and argues that it is illegal. We agree with Nakamura that the district court was without authority to impose a six-month driver's license suspension for a violation of HRS § 291C-105.
Nakamura was charged with a single count of Excessive Speeding on June 25, 2007, a petty misdemeanor, for his conduct occurring on May 26, 2007. (2) Nakamura subsequently entered a plea of guilty to this charge, with the following understanding as stated by his counsel:
[A]fter pretrying the matter with you, your Honor, we have agreed to following [sic] your suggestion, and that is (indiscernible) agreement that fifteen hundred-dollar fine and six months suspension of the driver's license, and the (indiscernible) mandatory, and also impose thirty-six hours of community service work and a driver improvement course.
The district court eventually accepted Nakamura's plea and sentenced him to the foregoing and $75 driver education, $25 neurotrauma, and $30 criminal injury assessments.
On September 14, 2007, Nakamura filed a motion to correct illegal sentence. In his declaration in support of the motion, Nakamura's counsel maintained that
3. This Court did not follow the plea agreement between the Office of the Prosecution [sic] and the Office of the Public Defender and imposed as part of the sentence a fine of $1,500.00 and a driver's license suspension for a period of 6 months.
At the hearing on his motion, Nakamura repeated his belief that his sentence for Excessive Speeding was governed by HRS § 291C-161(c), to which the district court responded by quoting from HRS § 286-125 (2007) and ruled,
I think we have an overlapping statute here. . . . [N]otwithstanding, I have sentenced in accordance with that section, and I'm . . . imposing a concurrent additional suspension.
The district court granted Nakamura's motion in part by reducing the fine imposed to $1000 but denied Nakamura's motion insofar as the six-month suspended driver's license term was concerned and imposed an additional thirty-day driver's license suspension to be served concurrently with the six-month license suspension. Nakamura filed his timely appeal from the judgment as amended.
As his sole issue on appeal, Nakamura argues (4) that the district court was bound by the plain language of HRS § 291C-105 and was thereby required to impose no more than a thirty-day driver's license suspension.
Statutory interpretation is "a question of law reviewable de novo." State v. Levi, 102 Hawai‘i 282, 285, 75 P.3d 1173, 1176 (2003) (quoting State v. Arceo, 84 Hawai‘i 1, 10, 928 P.2d 843, 852 (1996)). This court's statutory construction is guided by established rules:
First, the fundamental starting point for statutory interpretation is the language of the statute itself. Second, where the statutory language is plain and unambiguous, our sole duty is to give effect to its plain and obvious meaning. Third, implicit in the task of statutory construction is our foremost obligation to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature, which is to be obtained primarily from the language contained in the statute itself. Fourth, when there is doubt, doubleness of meaning, or indistinctiveness or uncertainty of an expression used in a statute, an ambiguity exists.
Upon review of HRS § 291C-105, (5) we conclude that the plain language of the statute requires that the sentencing court impose the list of sanctions as specified in HRS § 291C-105(c), which provides that a person who has violated the section "shall be sentenced as follows." Subsection (c) provides for suspension of a driver's license as one of the sanctions to be imposed. Thus, the duration of a first-time offender's driver's license suspension is governed by HRS § 291C-105(c)(1)(B) and is set thereby at thirty days.
The district court noted that it was imposing the six-month driver's license suspension based on HRS § 286-125. (6) HRS § 286-125 authorizes driver's license suspensions for, inter alia, a violation of any State traffic law and places no limit on the length of the suspension authorized. As the district court correctly noted, HRS §§ 286-125 and 291C-105 overlap with regard to the courts' authority to suspend a driver's license for violation of traffic laws and "[l]aws in pari materia, or upon the same subject matter, shall be construed with reference to each other. What is clear in one statute may be called upon in aid to explain what is doubtful in another." HRS § 1-16 (1993).
However, reading HRS § 286-125 as authorizing a driver's license suspension that differs from that specified in HRS § 291C-105(c) is contrary to the courts' "foremost obligation [which] is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature, which is to be obtained primarily from the language contained in the statute itself." State v. Wells, 78 Hawai‘i 373, 376, 894 P.2d 70, 73 (1995) (quoting Pacific Int'l Servs. Corp. v. Hurip, 76 Hawai‘i 209, 216, 873 P.2d 88, 95 (1994) (internal quotations marks omitted.) This reading resulted in, at a minimum, modifying the mix of penalties designed by the legislature when it created the offense of Excessive Speeding and included it in the Traffic Code. If there were any doubt that the legislature intended these penalties be imposed for this offense, the legislature also inserted language in the Traffic Code's general penalty provision, HRS § 291C-161, that persons convicted of violating certain specified statutes, including HRS § 291C-105, "shall be sentenced in accordance" with those specified statutes.
Moreover, giving effect to the sanction defined by HRS § 291C-105(c), was not inconsistent with the general grant of authority to suspend driver's licenses provided by HRS § 286-125. Rather, this reading of HRS § 286-125 and HRS § 291C-105 harmonizes the two provisions as it recognizes the authority vested in the courts by the legislature to impose license suspensions for violations of traffic laws generally, but also gives force and effect to the legislature's sentencing scheme for violations of the specific offense of Excessive Speeding.
As a six-month driver's license suspension was not authorized by HRS § 291C-105(c), we vacate the sentence imposed in the October 5, 2007 Amended Judgment and Sentence entered by the District Court of the First Circuit, Honolulu Division and remand for resentencing consistent with this opinion.
On the briefs:
Phyllis J. Hironaka,1. The Honorable T. David Woo presided.
2. A second count was dismissed with prejudice on May 26, 2007.
3. HRS § 291C-161(c) (Supp. 2006) provides, "Every person convicted of violating section 291C-12, 291C-12.5, 291C-12.6, 291C-95, or 291C-105 shall be sentenced in accordance with those sections."
4. We note, as a preliminary matter, that Nakamura agreed to the sentence imposed by the district court. However, agreed to or not, "a court may only pronounce a sentence 'which the law hath annexed to the crime[,]' and 'a sentence which does not conform to statutory sentencing provisions, either in the character or the extent of the punishment imposed, is void.'" State v. Sequeira, 93 Hawai‘i 34, 36, 995 P.2d 335, 337 (App. 2000) (quoting Territory v. Armstrong, 22 Haw. 526, 535 (1915) and 21A Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law § 825 at 88 (1998)). See also, State v. March, 94 Hawai‘i 250, 254, 11 P.3d 1094, 1098 (2000) (citations omitted) ("Although the sentencing court is given broad discretion in sentencing defendants, the sentence imposed must be authorized by statute.").
5. We assume, in the absence of any contrary indication in the record, that Nakamura was, at the time of the instant offense, a first-time offender. HRS § 291C-105(c)(1) (2007) specified the penalty for a first-time offender at the time of Nakamura's offense and read,
6. HRS § 286-125 provides,